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Abstract The current literature formally links “OR forms” (named after Osborne
and Rubinstein 1994) with “KS forms” (named after Kuhn and Selten by Kline and
Luckraz 2016). It also formally links “simple forms” with “AR forms” (both from
Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger 2016, with the former less prominent than the latter).
This paper makes three contributions. First, it introduces a fifth game form whose
nodes are sets of past choices. Second, it formally links these new “choice-set forms”
with OR forms. Third, it formally links KS forms with simple forms. The result is a
formal five-way equivalence which provides game theorists with a broad spectrum of
alternative game specifications.
Keywords game tree · extensive form game

Mathematics Subject Classification (2000) 91A70
1 Introduction
1.1 Introducing choice-set forms
The first contribution of this paper is to introduce a new game specification in which
nodes are sets of past choices. An example choice-set form appears in Figure 1.1.
This is similar but not identical to the well-known Osborne-Rubinstein (OR) game
specification in which nodes are sequences of past choices. An example OR form
also appears in Figure 1.1. The new specification has an apparent advantage in the
sense that sets are simpler mathematical objects than sequences. Section 7 carefully
discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the new specification relative to the
OR form, and also relative to the remaining three specifications in this paper.
Peter A. Streufert
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Fig. 1.1 Selten’s “horse” in each of the five specifications. This paper [a] introduces choice-set forms, [b]
links choice-set forms and OR forms, and [c] links KS forms and simple forms. (This figure shows the
tree, the choices, and the information sets of each form. The figure does not show players.)

1.2 Linking choice-set forms and OR forms

The second contribution of this paper is to build a formal connection between choiceset forms and OR forms. This formal equivalence will require two qualifications,
because choice-set forms are slightly less general than OR forms in two regards. First,
choice-set forms implicitly impose no absentmindedness in the sense of Piccione and
Rubinstein 1997. Second, they implicitly impose no shared alternatives in the sense
that two information sets are not allowed to share the same (feasible) alternatives (i.e.,
choices).
Theorem 3.1 shows that every OR form with no absentmindedness and no shared
alternatives is equivalent to a choice-set form. Conversely, Theorem 3.2 shows that
every choice-set form is equivalent to an OR form with no absentmindedness and
no shared alternatives. Thus the theorems show (given no absentmindedness and no
shared alternatives) that there is a logical redundancy at the heart of the OR specification: sets of past choices can unambiguously replace sequences of past choices.
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Fig. 1.2 All five specifications are essentially equivalent, even though they are fundamentally different in
how they specify nodes and choices. (A minor issue is that only OR forms and KS forms allow absentmindedness. Section 7.1 discusses absentmindedness, shared alternatives, and two other minor issues).

1.3 Linking OR forms, KS forms, simple forms, and AR forms
Let an “AR form” be a discrete extensive form as defined by Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger 2016a (henceforth AR16). An example AR form appears in Figure 1.1. Such
forms extend the specification of von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944. Incidentally,
AR16 also defines non-discrete extensive forms for differential and yet more general
games. Such non-discrete forms are beyond the scope of this paper.
The current literature1 does not provide a formal connection between OR forms
and AR forms. This may be surprising because some prominent and valuable articles2 have tangentially and informally suggested otherwise. It seems that the misstep
was caused by improperly combining the following two (correct) results from AR16.
[a] AR16 Example 6.5 (page 145) essentially says that OR trees constitute a special
case of “simple trees”. This accords with Figure 1.2’s top line, which shows that OR
trees specify nodes as choice sequences while simple trees specify nodes as abstract
entities. [b] AR16 Theorems 6.2 and 6.4 (pages 139 and 147) say that “simple forms”
1 This reference to the literature excludes an earlier multi-paper version of the present paper. Streufert
2015b links OR forms and choice-set forms, and Streufert 2015c links choice-set forms and AR forms.
That connection between OR forms and AR forms is less straightforward than the one in this paper.
2 Examples include Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger 2017a (page 316 footnote 3) and Kline and Luckraz
2016 (page 92, first two sentences). (The former refers to Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger 2013 Example 10
(page 93), which is the same as AR16 Example 6.5 in [a] below.)
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are equivalent to AR forms. This equivalence is repeated here as Theorems 6.1 and
6.2, and is shown between the last two columns of Figure 1.2. Together, [a] and [b]
might seem to suggest that OR forms are special cases of AR forms. But this logic
would be faulty because [a] concerns only trees while [b] concerns entire forms.3
Thus the reasoning does not provide a formal link between OR forms and AR forms.
Fortunately, it only remains to link OR forms and simple forms because [b] links
simple forms and AR forms. Further, part of this remaining gap is bridged by Kline
and Luckraz 2016 (henceforth KL16). They essentially show that OR forms are
equivalent to “KS forms”, where the initials K and S correspond to Kuhn 1953 and
Selten 1975. This equivalence is repeated here as Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, and is shown
between the OR and KS columns of Figure 1.2.4
Thus it yet remains to link KS forms and simple forms. KS forms and simple
forms are similar in that they both specify nodes as abstract entities (as shown in the
top row of Figure 1.2). However, KS forms and simple forms differ in that KS forms
specify their choices as abstract entities, while simple forms specify their choices as
sets of nodes (as shown in the second row of Figure 1.2).
The third contribution of this paper is to bridge this gap between KS forms and
simple forms. This new equivalence appears as Theorems 5.1 and 5.2, and is shown
between the KS and simple columns of Figure 1.2. With this missing piece in place,
it emerges that all five specifications are essentially equivalent. This provides game
theorists with a wide spectrum of equivalent specifications.
1.4 Organization
Sections 2–6 of this paper move from left to right across the five specification in
Figure 1.2. Section 7 considers the minor qualifications in the theorems, and discusses
the advantages and disadvantages of each game specification. Finally, the four pairs of
equivalence theorems in this paper suggest four equivalences between subcategories
of a category of game forms. First steps in this direction are Streufert 2017 and 2016.
2 Choice-set forms
The following game specification is new.
Let N be a set of nodes n, and let C be a set of choices c. By assumption, each
node is a set of choices. In other words, each node n satisfies n ✓ C. A node can be
either a finite set or an infinite set. Let T be the set of finite nodes t. In other words,
3 The distinction between tree and form can be subtle. AR16 and the present paper use “tree” to mean
nodes and precedence, and use “form” to mean a tree together with choices, information sets, and players. [a] concerns trees. In particular, there is nothing in AR16 Example 6.5 that concerns the choices of
the simple specification. (The choices of the OR specification do appear in AR16 Example 6.5, but only
because OR nodes are specified in terms of those choices.)
4 KL16 uses the word “tree” differently than it is used in AR16, the present paper, and much of the
literature. In particular, their theorems show the equivalence of “OR-trees” and “KS-trees”, where a “KStree” is defined to be a tree augmented with choices. Accordingly, their “KS-tree” is about halfway from a
tree to a form (as this paper and much of the literature uses those two terms).
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let T = { n2N | n is a finite set }. A choice-set tree is a pair (C, N) such that [cs1] N
is a nonempty collection of subsets of C,
[cs2] (8t2T r{{}})(9!c2C) c2t and t r{c}2T, and
[cs3] N rT = { [T ⇤ | T ⇤ is an infinite chain in T }.

To understand [cs2], let a last choice of a finite node t be any choice c2t such
that t r{c} is also a node. In other words, let a last choice of a node be any choice in
the node whose removal results in another node. [cs2] requires that each nonempty
node has a unique last choice. For example, the pair C = {a} and N = {{a}} does
not satisfy [cs2] because T = N and the node t = {a} does not have a last choice.
In contrast, the pair C = {a} and N = {{}, {a}} does satisfy [cs2] because {a} is
the only nonempty finite node and its last choice is a. For another example, the pair
C = {a, b} and N = {{}, {a}, {b}, {a, b}} violates [cs2] because both a and b are last
choices of the node {a, b}. In contrast, the pair C = {a, b} and N = {{}, {b}, {a, b}}
satisfies [cs2]. Finally, consider the set C of choices and the set N of nodes shown in
the top left diagram of Figure 1.1. This pair of sets satisfies [cs2] because each of its
eight nonempty nodes has a unique last choice.
To understand [cs3], note that this equation relates the infinite nodes (that is, the
members of N rT ) to the finite nodes (that is, the members of T ). By definition, a
chain in T is a subcollection T ⇤ ✓ T such that any two distinct nodes t and t 0 in T ⇤
satisfy t ⇢ t 0 or t t 0 . The union of an infinite chain of finite nodes is obviously an
infinite set. The ◆ direction of [cs3] requires that each such union must be a node. For
example, the pair C = Z and N = {{}, {4}, {4, 5}, {4, 5, 6}, ...} violates [cs3] because
[a] T = N, [b] T ⇤ = T is an infinite chain in T , and [c] [T ⇤ = {4, 5, 6, ...} 2
/ N.
In contrast the pair C = Z and N = {{}, {4}, {4, 5}, {4, 5, 6}, ...} [ {{4, 5, 6, ...}}
satisfies [cs3]. Meanwhile, the ✓ direction of [cs3] requires that every infinite node
is the union of an infinite chain of finite nodes. For example, the pair C = Z and
N = {{}, {4}, {4, 5}, {4, 5, 6}, ...} [ {{4, 5, 6, ...}, {5, 6, 7, ...}} violates [cs3] because
{5, 6, 7, ...} cannot be constructed as the union of an infinite chain of finite nodes.
Incidentally, the ✓ direction of [cs3] implies that every infinite node is countable. It
also implies, with the help of [cs1]–[cs2], that {} 2 T .5 Call {} the root node.
Now derive two entities from a choice-set tree (C, N). First, define (Ct )t2T at
each t by Ct = { c2C | c2t
/ and t[{c}2T }. Thus each Ct is the set of choices that
are feasible at the node t. Second, define X = {t2T |Ct 6=? }. Call its members the
decision nodes. Then assume
[cs4] { {t2X|c2Ct }6=? | c2C } is pairwise disjoint.
[cs4] considers a collection of sets. Call each of its member sets an information set.
Note each {t2X|c2Ct } is the set of decision nodes from which the choice c is feasible.
Routinely, the same set is generated by multiple choices. That set is the information
set from which those choices are feasible. [cs4] requires that these constructed information sets cannot intersect. The familiar properties of information sets then follow.
5

To prove this, note N is nonempty by [cs1]. Thus, either T is nonempty, or N rT is nonempty. The latter
also implies that T is nonempty by the ✓ direction of [cs3]. Hence there is a t 2 T . Hence |t| applications
of [cs2] imply {} 2 T .
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In particular, [a] the collection of information sets partitions the decision-node set X,6
and [b] two nodes in the same information set have the same set of feasible choices.7
For example, consider the choice-set tree defined by C = {a, b, e, f} and N =
{{}, {a}, {b}, {a, e}, {a, f}, {b, e}}. Here X = {{}, {a}, {b}}, C{} = {a, b}, C{a} =
{e, f}, and C{b} = {e}. Thus {t2X|e2Ct } = {{a}, {b}} and {t2X|f2Ct } = {{a}}.
These two sets of decision nodes are unequal and intersecting, in violation of [cs4].
In contrast, consider Figure 1.1’s choice-set tree (the figure’s dashed line is irrelevant
at this point). In other words, consider C = {a, b, g, d, e, f} and N = {{}, {a}, {a, g},
{b}, {a, d}, {b, e}, {b, f}, {a, d, e}, {a, d, f}}. Here X = {{}, {a}, {b}, {a, d}}, C{} =
{a, b}, C{a} = {g, d}, and C{b} = C{a,d} = {e, f}. Thus [i] {t2X|a2Ct } = {t2X|b2Ct }
= {{}}, and [ii] {t2X|g2Ct } = {t2X|d2Ct } = {{a}}, and [iii] {t2X|e2Ct } =
{t2X|f2Ct } = {{b}, {a, d}} (the figure’s dashed line shows this set [iii]). These three
sets of decision nodes are disjoint, as [cs4] requires. They are the form’s (constructed)
information sets.
Further, let I be a set of players i, and let (Ci )i2I assign a set Ci of choices to each
player i. A choice-set form is a pair ((Ci )i2I , N) such that ([i2I Ci , N) is a choiceset tree which satisfies [cs4], and in addition, [cs5] (8i2I, j2I r{i}) Ci \C j = ? and
[cs6] (8t2X)(9i2I) Ct ✓ Ci . [cs5] requires that each choice is assigned to exactly one
player. Thus [cs6] implies that all a decision node’s choices are assigned to exactly
one player. Thus [b] (two paragraphs above) implies that all an information set’s
choices are assigned to exactly one player.
This paper does not formally specify preferences. Rather this paragraph merely
notes that the set of outcomes is N rX = (N rT )[(T rX). The set N rT consists of
the infinite nodes, and the set T rX consists of the finite nodes that are not decision
nodes. Later, preferences can be assigned over N rX, or more generally if appropriate
assumptions are introduced, over some space of probability distributions over N rX.
3 OR Forms
3.1 Definition
An OR form here is identical to a game in Osborne and Rubinstein 1994 (page 200)
without the players’ preferences. This specification is repeated in KL16 (page 86).8
6 To prove this, first note that each information set is nonempty by inspection (empty sets of the form
{t2X|c2Ct } arise from choices c that are never feasible, and [cs4]’s construction simply discards them).
Second, the information sets are disjoint by [cs4] itself. Third, the union of the information sets is a subset
of X because each information set is a subset of X by inspection (incidentally (8c2C) {t2X|c2Ct } =
{t2T |c2Ct }). To show the reverse inclusion, take any t ⇤ 2 X. Its Ct ⇤ is nonempty by the definition of X,
and so, there exists c⇤ 2 Ct ⇤ such that t ⇤ 2 {t2X|c⇤ 2Ct }.
7 To prove this, suppose both t 1 and t 2 belong to the information set {t2X|cA 2C } and yet C 6= C .
t
t1
t2
Without loss of generality, the inequality implies that there exists cB 2 Ct 1 rCt 2 . Thus t 1 2 {t2X|cB 2Ct }
and t 2 2
/ {t2X|cB 2Ct }. Then {t2X|cA 2Ct } and {t2T |cB 2Ct } intersect because they both contain t 1 , and
yet they are unequal because the first contains t 2 and the second does not. This contradicts [cs4].
8 Several changes have been made to facilitate comparison across game specifications. First, a 2 A and
K
(ak )K
k21 = h 2 H in KL16 become c 2C and (ck )k=1 = n̄ 2 N̄ here. Second, OR1 and OR2 there become
[OR2] here. Third, H f and H D become T̄ and X̄. Fourth, (Ah )h2H f becomes (Ct¯)t¯2T̄ . Fifth, i 2 N and
(Ii )i2N become i 2 I and (H¯i )i2I . Sixth, P and Pi become P̄ and P̄ 1 (i).
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Let C be a set of choices c, and let N̄ be a set of nodes n̄. By assumption, each
node is a sequence of choices. In other words, each node is of the form n̄ = (ck )Kk=1 ,
where K 2 {0, 1, 2, ...}[{•}. Note that (ck )0k=1 = {} is the empty sequence. An OR
tree is a pair (C, N̄) such that [OR1] N̄ is a nonempty collection of sequences in C,
[OR2] (8 (ck )Kk=1 2N̄, L<K) (ck )Lk=1 2 N̄ (where both K = • and L = 0 are permit•
•
L
•
ted), and [OR3] (8 (ck )•
k=1 2C ) (ck )k=1 2 N̄ if (8L<•) (ck )k=1 2 N̄ (where C is
the collection of infinite sequences in C).
This paragraph derives three entities from an OR tree. First, let T̄ = N̄ rC• be
the collection of finite sequences t¯ belonging to N̄. Second, define (Ct¯)t¯2T̄ at each t¯
by Ct¯ = { c2C | t¯ (c)2T̄ }, where t¯ (c) is the concatenation of the finite sequence t¯
with the one-element sequence (c). Thus each Ct¯ is the set of choices that are feasible
at the node t¯. Third, define X̄ = { t¯2T̄ |Ct¯6=? }. Call X̄ the set of decision nodes.
Next let I be a set of players i, and assign decision nodes to players by a playerassignment function P̄. In brief, assume [OR4] P̄:X̄!I. Then associate with each
player i a collection H¯i of information sets H̄. Assume [OR5] (8i2I) H¯i partitions
P̄ 1 (i). Thus each player’s information-set collection H¯i partitions the player’s set
P̄ 1 (i) of decision nodes. Further assume [OR6] (8H̄2[i2I H¯i , t¯2H̄, t¯0 2H̄) Ct¯ = Ct¯0 .
This is the usual assumption that two nodes in the same information set must have the
same feasible choices. By definition, an OR form h(C, N̄), (P̄, (H¯i )i2I )i is an OR tree
(C, N̄) together with a player set I, a player-assignment function P̄, and a list (H¯i )i2I
of player information-set collections that satisfy [OR4]-[OR6].
This paper does not formally specify preferences. Rather this paragraph merely
notes that the set of outcomes is N̄ rX̄ = (N̄ rT̄ )[(T̄ rX̄). The set N̄ rT̄ consists of
the infinite sequences, and the set T̄ rX̄ consists of the nondecision finite sequences.
Later, preferences can be defined over N̄ rX̄, or more generally if appropriate assumptions are introduced, over some space of probability distributions over N̄ rX̄.

3.2 The equivalence between choice-set forms and OR forms
[OR6] states that two nodes in the same information set have the same alternatives.9
As usual, define CH̄ at each H̄ 2 [i2I H¯i by (8t¯2H̄) CH̄ = Ct¯. Thus CH̄ is the set
of alternatives at the information set H̄. An OR form has no shared alternatives iff
(8H̄2[i2I Hi , H̄ 0 2[i2I H¯i ) H̄ 6= H̄ 0 implies CH̄ \CH̄ 0 = ?. In other words, a form has
no shared alternatives iff each of its information sets has its own alternatives. On the
one hand, this condition is vacuous in the sense that one can always introduce enough
alternatives so that each information set has its own alternatives. On the other hand,
it is natural to repeatedly use the same alternatives in a repeated game.
An OR form has no absentmindedness iff (6 9H̄2[i2I H¯i , (ck )Kk=1 2H̄, L<K)
(ck )Lk=1 2 H̄ (Piccione and Rubinstein 1997 page 10). In other words, a form has
no absentmindedness iff none of its information sets contains both a node and a predecessor of that node. No-absentmindedness is regarded as a very weak assumption.
It is explicitly incorporated into the game specification of Kuhn 1953 (page 48 Definition 2(II)), and is defended at length by AR16 (Section 4.2.3). Further, it is weaker
9

The terms “alternative”, “action”, and “choice” are fundamentally synonymous (see note 22).
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Fig. 3.1 An OR form with no absentmindedness. In accord with Proposition 3.0, R|N̄ is injective.

than perfect recall, and AR16 (page 150) argues that a game without perfect recall
“fails to capture rational behaviour”.
No-absentmindedness plays a pivotal role in this section, as the following theorem
demonstrates. In the theorem, the function R takes any sequence (ck )Kk=1 to its range.
In particular, if K is finite, R takes (ck )Kk=1 = (c1 , c2 , ... cK ) to {c1 , c2 , ... cK }. Similarly,
if K is infinite, R takes (ck )Kk=1 = (c1 , c2 , ... ) to {c1 , c2 , ... }.
Proposition 3.0 Consider an OR form with no shared alternatives, and let N̄ be
its collection of nodes. Then the form has no absentmindedness iff R|N̄ is injective.
(Proof: Lemma A.5(a,c).)
Consider the forward direction of the proposition. This paragraph notes how easy
it is to derive injectivity when the form’s information sets are ordered. Consider
any node n̄. Since a choice determines its information set because of the no-sharedalternatives assumption, the choices in R(n̄) must be played in the order of their information sets. Hence the set R(n̄) determines the sequence n̄.
But the forward direction of Proposition 3.0 goes further. It shows that R|N̄ is
injective even when the form’s information sets are unordered, provided only that
no-absentmindedness holds. For example, consider Figure 3.1,10 which replicates the
classic example of unordered information sets from Kuhn 1953 Figure 1, Gilboa 1997
Figure 2, Ritzberger 1999 Figure 1, and Ritzberger 2002 Figure 3.8. Unordered information sets give rise to choices that can be played in different orders. Accordingly,
the choices o1 and o2 in Figure 3.1 have been played in different orders at the nodes
(f 1 , o1 , o2 ) and (f 2 , o2 , o1 ). However, the choices in R((f 1 , o1 , o2 )) = {f 1 , o1 , o2 } can
only be played in the order (f 1 , o1 , o2 ), and the choices in R((f 2 , o2 , o1 )) = {f 2 , o1 , o2 }
10 Imagine that Spy 1 and Spy 2 are racing to recover a document from a safe deposit box. En route
one spy realizes that if she reaches the box first, she can install a bomb that will explode when the other
spy reaches the box after her. But then she realizes that the other spy will be thinking the same thing, and
hence, if she opens the box when she reaches it, she will find either the document or an exploding bomb.
So, she considers destroying the bank without opening the box in hopes of keeping the document from the
other spy. Figure 3.1 specifies this situation. Chance determines whether Spy 1 (f 1 ) or Spy 2 (f 2 ) arrives
first. Then the two spies either open (o) the box or destroy (d) the bank.
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(a)

b

b

(b)
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a
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Fig. 3.2 An OR form with absentmindedness. In accord with Proposition 3.0, R|N̄ is not injective (consider
(a) and (a, a)).

can only be played in the order (f 2 , o2 , o1 ). Intuitively, this happens because the set
{f 1 , o1 , o2 } contains f 1 , and because the set {f 2 , o1 , o2 } contains f 2 . This suggests
that if a form has two choices whose order is not exogenously determined, then any
sequence that lists the two choices must also list another choice (or set of choices)
that determines their order. Showing that this can be done, whenever there is noabsentmindedness, is the interesting part of the proposition’s proof.
Meanwhile, the reverse direction of Proposition 3.0 shows that no-absentmindedness is necessary for injectivity. For example, consider Figure 3.2, which replicates
the classic example of absentmindedness in Piccione and Rubinstein 1997 Figure 1.
Here R takes both the sequence (a) and the sequence (a, a) to the set {a}. Thus,
R|N̄ is not injective. The proposition’s proof shows that something similar happens
whenever no-absentmindedness is violated.
Theorem 3.1 uses the forward direction of Proposition 3.0 to show that every OR
form with no shared alternatives and no absentmindedness is equivalent to a choiceset form. The reverse direction of Proposition 3.0 shows that Theorem 3.1 cannot be
extended to include any OR forms that have absentmindedness.
Theorem 3.1 (choice-set OR) Suppose h(C, N̄), (P̄, (H¯i )i2I )i is an OR form with
no shared alternatives and no absentmindedness. Define N = {R(n̄)|n̄2N̄}. Then (a)
(C, N) is a choice-set tree and R|N̄ is a bijection from N̄ onto N. Further, define (Ci )i2I
at each i by Ci = [H̄2H¯i CH̄ , where (CH̄ )H̄2H¯i is derived from the OR form. Then (b)
((Ci )i2I , N) is a choice-set form. (Proof A.7.)
Conversely, Theorem 3.2 shows that every choice-set form is equivalent to an
OR form with no shared alternatives and no absentmindedness. The theorem’s proof
constructs the OR form, and is the longest proof in the paper.
Theorem 3.2 (choice-set ! OR) Suppose ((Ci )i2I , N) is a choice-set form. Then (a)
there is an N̄ such that ([i2I Ci , N̄) is an OR tree and R|N̄ is a bijection from N̄ onto N.
Further, derive T̄ , (Ct¯)t¯2T̄ , and X̄ from this OR tree. Also define P̄:X̄!I at each t¯ 2 X̄
by setting P̄(t¯) equal to the unique i for which Ct¯ ✓ Ci . Also define (H¯i )i2I at each
i by { {t¯2X̄|c2Ct¯}6=? | c2Ci }. Then (b) h([i2I Ci , N̄), (P̄, (H¯i )i2I )i is a well-defined
OR form with no shared alternatives and no absentmindedness. (Proof A.8.)
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4 KS Forms
4.1 Definition
A KS form here is identical to a KS game (KL16 page 89) without the players’
preferences.11 The letters K and S refer to Kuhn 1953 and Selten 1975.
Begin with a set T of nodes t, and a set E of edges e. By definition, a pair (T, E)
is a directed graph iff E ✓ {(t,t ] )2T 2 |t6=t ] } (Bang-Jensen and Gutin 2009 page 2).
Say that one node t immediately precedes another node t ] iff t is immediately succeeded by t ] iff (t,t ] ) 2 E. Further, say that a finite walk from t 1 to t K is a sequence
(t k )Kk=1 such that K2{2, 3, ...} and (8k<K) (t k ,t k+1 ) 2 E (Bang-Jensen and Gutin
2009 page 11). Similarly, an infinite walk from t 1 is a sequence (t k )Kk=1 such that
K = • and (8k<K) (t k ,t k+1 ) 2 E. By definition, a KS graph-tree is a triple (T, E, r)
such that [KS1] (T, E) is a directed graph and r 2 T , and [KS2] for each t ] 2 T r{r}
there is a unique finite walk from r to t ] . Call r the root node of the graph-tree. Further, let X = {t2T |(9t ] 2T )(t,t ] )2E} be the set of nodes with at least one successor,
and call each t 2 X a decision node.
Next associate, with each node t 2 T , a set Ct of feasible choices c. Such a feasible set can be empty. Further, associate, with each node t 2 T , a choice-to-successor
function yt :Ct !{t ] 2T |(t,t ] )2E}, which is a bijection from t’s feasible set Ct of
choices c onto the set {t ] 2T |(t,t ] )2E} of nodes t ] that immediately succeed t. For
future reference, call this bijectivity assumption [KS3]. [KS3] implies [a] t 2 X iff
[b] Ct 6= ? iff [c] yt is a nonempty function. By definition, a KS augmented-tree
h(T, E, r), (Ct , yt )t2T i is a KS graph-tree (T, E, r) together with a (Ct , yt )t2T consisting of feasible sets and choice-to-successor functions that satisfy [KS3].
Now introduce a set I of players i, and assign decision nodes to players by
a player-assignment function P. Assume [KS4] P:X!I. Then associate with each
player i a collection Hi of information sets H. Assume [KS5] (8i2I) Hi partitions
P 1 (i). In other words, assume each player’s information-set collection Hi partitions
the player’s set P 1 (i) of decision nodes. Also assume [KS6] (8i2I, H2Hi , t2H,
t 0 2H) Ct = Ct 0 . Because of this, let CH denote the feasible-choice set at the information set H. By definition, a KS form h(T, E, r), (Ct , yt )t2T , (P, (Hi )i2I )i is a KS
augmented-tree h(T, E, r), (Ct , yt )t i together with a player set I, a player-assignment
function P, and a list (Hi )i2I of player information-set collections that satisfy [KS4]–
[KS6].
This paper does not formally specify preferences. Rather, this paragraph merely
suggests how other papers could add preferences to a KS form. Toward that end, take
a KS form and let Wr be the collection of (finite and infinite) walks from r. Then
let WrX = { (t k )Kk=0 2Wr | K<•, t K 2X } be the collection of (finite) walks from r to
a decision node. Finally, let Wr rWrX be the collection of outcomes.12 It consists of
11 Several changes have been made to facilitate comparison across game specifications. First,
h(V, E, r), (Av , yv )v2V )i in KL16 becomes h(T, E, r), (Ct , yt )t2T i here. Second, a “KS-tree” there becomes
a “KS augmented-tree” here (this accords with note 4). Third, V D becomes X. Fourth, P and P f and P D
become {(r)}[Wr and {(r)}[WrT and {(r)}[WrX . Fifth, both p and w[{(r, (r))} become w. Sixth, i 2 N
and (Ii )i2N become i 2 I and (Hi )i2I . Seventh, Pi becomes P 1 (i).
12 This construction fails when |T | = 1, which is a trivial case. (In this case there are no walks.)
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[i] the infinite walks from r, and [ii] the (finite) walks from r to nondecision nodes.
Later, preferences can be defined over Wr rWrX , or more generally if appropriate assumptions are introduced, over some space of probability distributions over Wr rWrX .
4.2 The Kline/Luckraz equivalence between OR forms and KS forms
Theorem 4.1 requires some additional notation. As in the previous paragraph, consider a KS form and let Wr be the collection of walks from r. Next let WrT =
{ (t k )Kk=0 2Wr | K<• } be the collection of finite walks from r. Finally, let the nodeto-walk function w:T !{(r)}[WrT be the bijection mapping [i] r 2 T to (r) and [ii]
each t ] 2 T r{r} to [KS2]’s walk from r to t ] .
Theorem 4.1 (OR KS) Suppose h(T, E, r), (Ct , yt )t2T , (P, (Hi )i2I )i is a KS form,
and derive its Wr . Define C = [t2T Ct . Also define a and N̄ by letting a be the surjective function, from {(r)}[Wr onto N̄ ✓ C• , such that a((r)) = {} and (8(t k )Kk=0 2Wr )
a((t k )Kk=0 ) = (yt k 11 (t k ))Kk=1 . Then (a) a is a well-defined bijection and (C, N̄) is an
OR tree. Further, derive w:T !{(r)}[WrT from the KS form by the previous paragraph. Also derive T̄ and X̄ from the OR tree (C, N̄). Also define P̄:X̄!I at each t¯ 2 X̄
by P̄(t¯) = P w 1 a 1 (t¯). Also define (H¯i )i2I at each i by H¯i = { {a w(t)|t2H} |
H2Hi }. Then (b) h(C, N̄), (P̄, (H¯i )i2I )i is an OR form. (Corollary of KL16 Lemma 2
and KL16 Theorem 1.)13
Theorem 4.2 (OR ! KS) Suppose h(C, N̄), (P̄, (H¯i )i2I )i is an OR form, and derive
its T̄ and (Ct¯)t¯2T̄ . Define E = { (t¯, t¯] )2T̄ 2 | (9c2C) t¯ (c)=t¯] }. Then (a) (T̄ , E, {})
is a KS graph-tree. Further, define (yt¯:Ct¯!T̄ )t¯2T̄ at each t¯ by (8c2Ct¯) yt¯(c) = t¯ (c).
Then (b) h(T̄ , E, {}), (Ct¯, yt¯)t¯2T̄ , (P̄, (H¯i )i2I )i is a KS form. (Corollary of KL16 Theorem 2.)
5 Simple Forms
5.1 Definition
A simple form here is virtually identical to a simple extensive form in AR16 (page
146).14 The difference is insignificant.15
Let T be a set of nodes t, and let be a binary relation on T . A simple tree (AR16
page 143) is a pair (T, ) such that [s1] (T, ) is a partial ordering (AR16 page 20)
with a maximum, [s2] (8s2T ) {t2T |t s} is a finite chain, and [s3] (8t2T,t A 2T ) t >
13

More details of my adaptations, of both KL16 and AR16, are available on request.
Some notational changes have been made to facilitate comparison across game specifications. First, x0
there becomes r here. Second, T = (N, ) there becomes (T, ) here. In other words, [a] N there becomes
T here, and [b] T there has no equivalent here.
15 The difference is that [s4] strengthens the phrase before AR16 page 146 Definition 6.4 (SF1) by
requiring that [1] no choice ĉ 2 [i2I Ĉi contains r, and [2] no choice ĉ 2 [i2I Ĉi equals ?. I argue that [1]
and [2] are insignificant by considering the set p(ĉ) of nodes at which such choices ĉ would be feasible.
Regarding [1], suppose ĉ did contain r. Then p(ĉ) = {p(t)|t2ĉ} would contain p(r), which is ill-defined.
Regarding [2], p(?) = {p(t ] )|t ] 2?} is empty, and thus ? is never feasible.
14
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t A implies (9t B 2T ) t > t B and neither t A t B nor t B t A . Define r = max T , and call
r the root node. Say that t precedes t ] iff t is succeeded by t ] iff t > t ] . Let X ✓ T be
the set of nodes t which have at least one successor, and call every such node t 2 X
a decision node. Define p:T r{r}!X by p(t ] ) = min{t2T |t>t ] }, and call p(t ] ) the
(immediate) predecessor of the node t ] (AR16, page 145).
By assumption, a choice ĉ will be a nonempty set of non-root nodes t ] 2 T r{r}.
In other words, each choice ĉ satisfies ? 6= ĉ ✓ T r{r}. The set of nodes at which a
choice ĉ is feasible is p(ĉ) = {p(t ] )|t ] 2ĉ} (AR16 page 145). Note that this equation
is the standard way of defining the image of a set (such as ĉ) under a function (such
as p). Accordingly, p(ĉ) is the set of nodes p(t ] ) that immediately precede a node t ]
in ĉ. Further, let I be the set of players i, and let (Ĉi )i2I list a collection Ĉi of choices
ĉ for each player i.
At each decision node t 2 X, let Ai (t) = { ĉ2Ĉi |t2p(ĉ) } be the set of feasible
choices for player i, and let J(t) = { i2I | Ai (t)6=? } be the set of decision makers.
By definition, a simple (extensive) form (AR16 page 146, and note 15 here) is a
triple (T, , (Ĉi )i2I ) such that (T, ) is a simple tree, [s4] each Ĉi is a collection
of nonempty subsets ĉ of T r{r},
[s5] (8i2I, ĉ2Ĉi , ĉ0 2Ĉi )

[p(ĉ)\p(ĉ0 ) 6= ? and ĉ 6= ĉ0 ] implies [p(ĉ) = p(ĉ0 ) and ĉ\ĉ0 = ?],

[s6] (8t2X) J(t) 6= ? and
{ {t ] } |t ] 2p 1 (t) } = { p 1 (t)\(\i2J(t) ĉi ) | (ĉi )i2J(t) 2Pi2J(t) Ai (t) },
[s7] (8ĉ2[i2I Ĉi )(6 9{t ]A ,t ]B }✓ĉ) t ]A > t ]B , and [s8] (8t2X, ĉ2[i2I Ĉi ) p 1 (t)rĉ 6= ?.
AR16 (page 146) explains that [s5] concerns the standard properties of information
sets, that [s6] describes how choices determine successors when simultaneous decisions are allowed, and that [s7] prohibits absentmindedness. Among other things,
[s3] and [s8] prohibit trivial decisions.
This paper does not formally specify preferences. Rather this paragraph merely
notes that the outcomes of a simple form are the maximal chains of its simple tree
(such chains can be finite or infinite). Later preferences can be defined over the collection of maximal chains, or more generally if appropriate assumptions are introduced,
over some space of probability distributions over the collection of maximal chains.
5.2 The equivalence between KS forms and simple forms
The following two theorems are new. In both theorems, part (a) is more straightforward than part (b).
The theorems use some minor conditions, all of which are discussed in Section 7.1. First, say that a simple form has no simultaneous decisions iff (8t2X) J(x)
is a singleton. Second, say that a KS form has no absentmindedness iff (8H2[i2I Hi ,
t A 2H,t B 2H) there is not a walk from t A to t B . Third, say that a KS form has no trivial
decisions iff (8t2T ) |Ct | 6= 1.
Theorem 5.1 (KS simple) Suppose (T, , (Ĉi )i2I ) is a simple form with no simultaneous decisions, and derive its r, p, and X. Define E = {(t,t ] )2T 2 |t=p(t ] )}.
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Then (a) (T, E, r) is a KS graph-tree. Further, define (Ct )t2T at each t by Ct =
{ ĉ2[i2I Ĉi | t2p(ĉ) }. Also, define (yt :Ct !{t ] 2T |(t,t ] )2E})t2T at each t and each
ĉ2Ct by letting yt (ĉ) be the unique element of p 1 (t)\ĉ. Also, define P:X!I at
each t 2 X by letting P(t) equal to the unique i for which (9ĉ2Ĉi ) t 2 p(ĉ). Finally, define (Hi )i2I at each i by Hi = {p(ĉ)|ĉ2Ĉi }. Then (b) h(T, E, r), (Ct , yt )t2T ,
(P, (Hi )i2I )i is a well-defined KS form with no absentmindedness and no trivial decisions. (Proof A.9.)
Theorem 5.2 (KS ! simple) Suppose h(T, E, r), (Ct , yt )t2T , (P, (Hi )i2I )i is a KS
form with no absentmindedness and no trivial decisions. Let > be { (t,t ] )2T 2 | there
is a walk from t to t ] }, and let be { (t,t ] )2T 2 | t=t ] or t>t ] }. Then (a) (T, ) is a
simple tree. Further, define (Ĉi )i2I at each i by Ĉi = { {yt (c)|t2H} | c2CH , H2Hi }
where (CH )H2Hi is derived from the KS form. Then (b) (T, , (Ĉi )i2I ) is a simple form
with no simultaneous decisions. (Proof A.10.)
6 AR Forms
6.1 Definition
An AR form here is virtually identical to a discrete extensive form in AR16 (page
138).16 The difference is insignificant.17
Let Ṅ be a nonempty collection of nonempty sets ṅ. Define W = [Ṅ. Call Ṅ the
set of nodes ṅ, and call W the space of outcomes w. Notice that every node ṅ is a
subset of W . In other words, every node ṅ is a set of outcomes w. By definition, the
node ṅ 2 Ṅ precedes the node ṅ] 2 Ṅ iff ṅ is succeeded by ṅ] iff ṅ ṅ] . Note that W
itself can be a member of Ṅ. If so, ṅ = W is a node which precedes all other nodes
ṅ] 2 Ṅ r{W }.
By definition, a (discrete) AR tree (AR16 page 47 Definition 2.4, AR16 page 112
Definition 5.1, and AR16 page 135 Definition 6.1) is a pair (Ṅ, ◆) which satisfies two sets of conditions. First, it satisfies [AR1] (Ṅ, ◆) is a partially ordered
set, [AR2] W 2 Ṅ, where W is defined to be [Ṅ,18 [AR3] (8Ṅ ⇤ ✓Ṅ) Ṅ ⇤ is a chain
iff (9w2W )(8ṅ⇤ 2Ṅ ⇤ ) w 2 ṅ⇤ , and [AR4] (8w2W , w 0 2W ) w 6= w 0 implies (9ṅ2Ṅ,
ṅ0 2Ṅ) w 2 ṅrṅ0 and w 0 2 ṅ0 rṅ. Call W the root node, and let Ẋ = { ṅ2Ṅ | (9ṅ] 2Ṅ)
16

Some notational changes have been made to facilitate comparison across game specifications. First,
the set W of plays w in AR16 becomes the set W of outcomes w here. Second, F(N)r{W } there becomes
Ṫ r{W } here. Third, a move x 2 X there becomes a decision node t˙ 2 Ẋ here. Fourth, T = (N, ◆) there
becomes (Ṅ, ◆) here. In other words, [a] N there becomes Ṅ here, and [2] T there has no equivalent here
([a] merits emphasis because note 14 in the previous section changed N to T ).
17 The difference is that [AR7] strengthens the phrase before AR16 page 138 Definition 6.2 (DEF1) by
requiring that [1] no choice ċ 2 [i2I Ċi is equal to W , and [2] every choice ċ 2 [i2I Ċi is a superset of some
t˙] 2 T r{W }. I argue that [1] and [2] are insignificant by considering the set Ṗ(ċ) of nodes at which such
choices ċ would be feasible. Regarding [1], Ṗ(W ) = { ṗ(t˙] )|t˙] 2Ṫ , W ◆t˙] , (6 9t˙2Ṫ )W ◆t˙ t˙] } equals { ṗ(W )},
and ṗ(W ) is not naturally defined. Regarding [2], suppose that ċ 6= W (by [1]) and that ċ does not contain
any t˙] 2 T r{W }. Then Ṗ(ċ) = { ṗ(t˙] )|t˙] 2Ṫ , ċ◆t˙] , (6 9t˙2Ṫ )ċ◆t˙ t˙] } is empty, and thus there is no node at
which ċ is feasible.
18 [AR2] does not appear in AR16 page 47 Definition 2.4, but does appear in Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger
2013 page 78 Definition 1. The latter is relevant in the present (discrete) context. See, for example, the use
of rootedness in AR16 page 144 Proposition 6.5, first sentence of part (b)’s proof.
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ṅ ṅ] } be the set of decision nodes (AR16 page 69). Second, it satisfies [AR5] each
nonempty chain in Ṅ has a maximum, and [AR6] (8ṅ6=W ) {ṅ[ 2Ṅ|ṅ[ ṅ} has an infimum in {ṅ[ 2Ṅ|ṅ[ ṅ}[(Ṅ rẊ). Let ṗ(ṅ) = min{ṅ[ 2Ṅ|ṅ[ ṅ} be the (immediate)
predecessor of ṅ (AR16 page 133), and let Ṫ = {W }[{ṅ2Ṅ| ṗ(ṅ) exists}. Among
other things, [AR6] implies Ẋ ✓ Ṫ .19 Thus Ṅ is partitioned by {Ṅ rṪ , Ṫ rẊ, Ẋ}. Ṅ rṪ
is the set of nondecision nodes without immediate predecessors, Ṫ rẊ is the set of
nondecision nodes with immediate predecessors, and Ẋ is the set of decision nodes.20
Nondecision (i.e., “terminal”) nodes are closely related to outcomes. In particular,
nondecision nodes are singleton nodes in the sense that (8ṅ2Ṅ) ṅ 2
/ Ẋ iff (9w2W )
ṅ = {w} (AR16 page 86 Lemma 4.1(b)). This does not imply Ṅ ◆ {{w}|w2W }.21
However, Ṅ ◆ {{w}|w2W } does hold when Ṅ is finite. Further, there is a compelling sense in which any Ṅ can be expanded to Ṅ [ {{w}|w2W } without changing
its meaning (AR16 page 50 Proposition 2.11).
Now introduce a set I of players i, and let Ċi denote player i’s set of choices ċ. By
assumption, a choice ċ is a nonempty subset of W . Further, let P(ċ) denote the set of
nodes ṅ at which the choice ċ is feasible, and define it by Ṗ(ċ) = { ṗ(t˙] ) | t˙] 2Ṫ , ċ◆t˙] ,
and (6 9t˙2Ṫ ) ċ◆t˙ t˙] } (AR16 page 134 Proposition 6.2(b)). This Ṗ is not related to
the player-assignment functions P̄ and P of OR and KS forms.
At each decision node t˙ 2 Ẋ, let Ai (t˙) = { ċ2Ċi | t˙2P(ċ) } be the set of feasible
choices for player i, and let J(t˙) = { i2I | Ai (t˙)6=? } be the set of decision makers.
By definition, a (discrete) AR form (AR16 page 138, and note 17 here) is a triple
(Ṅ, ◆, (Ċi )i2I ) such that (Ṅ, ◆) is a (discrete) AR tree, [AR7] every ċ 2 [i2I Ċi is a
nonempty proper subset of W which is both the union of a subcollection of Ṅ and a
superset of some member of Ṫ r{W },
[AR8] (8i2I, ċ2Ċi , ċ0 2Ċi )

[ Ṗ(ċ)\Ṗ(ċ0 ) 6= ? and ċ 6= ċ0 ] ) [ Ṗ(ċ) = Ṗ(ċ0 ) and ċ\ċ0 = ? ], and
[AR9] (8t˙2Ẋ) J(t˙) 6= ? and
ṗ 1 (t˙) = { t˙\(\ j2J(t˙) ċ j ) | (ċ j ) j2J(t˙) 2P j2J(t˙) A j (t˙) }.
AR16 (page 138) explains that [AR8] states the standard properties of information
sets, and that [AR9] describes how choices determine successors when simultaneous
decisions are allowed.
This paper does not formally specify preferences. Rather this paragraph merely
recalls that the space W of outcomes is primitive (or, virtually the same, that Ṅ is
primitive and W is defined as [Ṅ). Thus it is straightforward to define preferences
over W . Recent contributions which do so include Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger 2016b,
2017b, and 2017c. More generally, preferences might be defined over some space of
probability distributions over W , if appropriate assumptions are introduced.
19

[AR6] implies that each non-root node without an immediate predecessor is necessarily a nondecision node (AR16 page 135 Proposition 6.3, second sentence of proof). In other words, (Ṅ r{W })rṪ ✓
(Ṅ r{W })rẊ. This is equivalent to Ẋ r{W } ✓ Ṫ r{W }. This implies Ẋ ✓ Ṫ since W 2 Ṫ by definition,.
20 This sentence fails when |Ṅ| = 1, which is a trivial case. (In such a case W is a nondecision node.)
21 For example, Ṅ 6◆ {{w}|w2W } in the AR16 tree that Theorem 6.2 constructs from any simple
tree having infinite maximal chains. This accords with the theorem’s claim that the AR16 tree is orderisomorphic to the simple tree: neither the AR16 tree nor the simple tree has (nondecision) nodes corresponding to the simple tree’s infinite maximal chains.
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6.2 The Alós-Ferrer/Ritzberger equivalence between simple forms and AR forms
Theorem 6.1 (simple AR) Suppose (Ṅ, ◆, (Ċi )i2I ) is a (discrete) AR form, and
derive its W , ṗ, and Ṫ . Then (a) (Ṫ , ◆) is a simple tree. Further, define (Ĉi )i2I at
each i by Ĉi = { { t˙] 2Ṫ r{W } | ċ6◆ p(t˙] ) and ċ◆t˙] } | ċ2Ċi }. Then (b) (Ṫ , ◆, (Ĉi )i2I ) is
a simple form. ((a) Corollary of AR16 page 144 Proposition 6.5(b). (b) Corollary of
AR16 page 139 Theorem 6.2 (DEF)EDP) and AR16 page 147 Theorem 6.4(b).)
The order isomorphism in Theorem 6.2 means that there is a bijection j:T !Ṅ
such that (8t2T,t ] 2T ) t t ] iff j(t) ◆ j(t ] ) (AR16 page 20). In this case, the bijection is T 3 t 7! {w2W |t2w} 2 Ṅ (AR16 page 144 note 7).
Theorem 6.2 (simple ! AR) Suppose (T, , (Ĉi )i2I ) is a simple form. Let W be
(T, )’s collection of maximal chains, and let Ṅ = { {w2W |t2w} | t2T }. Then (a)
(Ṅ, ◆) is a (discrete) AR tree which is order-isomorphic to (T, ). Further, define
(Ċi )i2I at each i by Ċi = { [t ] 2ĉ {w2W |t ] 2w} | ĉ2Ĉi }. Then (b) (Ṅ, ◆, (Ċ)i2I ) is a
(discrete) AR form. ((a) Corollary of AR16 page 144 Proposition 6.5(a). (b) Corollary
of AR16 page 147 Theorem 6.4(a) and AR16 page 139 Theorem 6.2 (EDP)DEF).)

7 Advantages and Disadvantages
7.1 Four minor features of the five specifications
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 restrict OR forms by no absentmindedness and no shared alternatives.22 Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 restrict KS forms by no absentmindedness and no
trivial decisions, and also restrict simple forms by no simultaneous decisions. Absentmindedness, shared alternatives, trivial decisions, and simultaneous decisions are
all features of game specifications. Each of these features corresponds to a row in
Table 7.1, and each is discussed in a paragraph below.

feature

choice-set

absentmindedness
shared alternatives
trivial decisions
simultaneous decisions

never
never
yes
later

<
<

OR

KS

yes
yes
yes
later

yes
yes
yes
later

>
>
<

simple

AR

later
—23
later
yes

never
—23
later
yes

Table 7.1 Four minor features of the five specifications. The inequalities slightly complicate this paper’s
new equivalence theorems. (Distinctions between “later” and “never” are conjectural.)
22

The terms “alternative”, “action”, and “choice” are fundamentally synonymous. The only distinction
is that “action” tends to be used when alternatives can be shared (e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein 1994;
KL16), and “choice” tends to be used when they cannot (e.g., von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944 Sections 9–10; Ritzberger 2002 Section 3.2; AR16). This paper uses “choice” because the new concept of
choice-set forms implicitly assumes that alternatives cannot be shared, as shown two paragraphs hence.
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Absentmindedness is listed first because it is the only feature whose absence limits the range of social interactions that can be modeled. At the same time, this limitation is very unimportant (Section 3.2, second paragraph). Absentmindedness is
currently allowed in OR forms and KS forms, and might later be allowed in simple
forms by removing [s7]. Absentmindedness is incompatible with choice-set forms
(Proposition 3.0) and AR forms (AR16 Section 4.2.3).
OR forms and KS forms allow information sets to share alternatives (i.e., choices),
and this can be convenient when defining a repeated game. Yet, disallowing shared
alternatives is an innocuous assumption in the sense that one can always introduce
enough alternatives so that each information set has its own alternatives. Choice-set
forms disallow shared alternatives because {t2X|c2Ct } (if nonempty) is the unique
information set associated with the choice c (recall [s4]).
Trivial decisions can be convenient for expanding game trees. Trivial decisions
are currently allowed in choice-set forms, OR forms, and KS forms. It seems they
might later be allowed in simple forms by altering [s3] and [s8], and in AR forms by
pursuing AR16 pages 64–65.
Simultaneous decisions are more convenient than cascading information sets in
the sense of AR16 pages 140–142. Simultaneous decisions are already built into simple forms and AR forms. A similar construction seems possible for choice-set forms,
OR forms, and KS forms (see for example Osborne and Rubinstein 1994 page 102).
7.2 General discussion
Although none of the four features is that important, Table 7.1 and the preceding paragraph argue that OR forms and KS forms have more features than choice-set forms
and AR forms. Further, simple forms seem able to gain absentmindedness by removing [s7] and to gain trivial decisions by altering [s3] and [s8]. In this sense, the three
middle specifications appear to be slightly more general than the two specifications
on the ends.
Now consider these three middle specifications in the context of Figure 1.2. The
left-right spectrum there is identical to the left-right spectrum in Table 7.1. KS forms
are special because both their nodes and their choices are abstract (see the top two
rows of Figure 1.2). This allows one to specify both nodes and choices flexibly, as
desired. OR forms are less flexible but more efficient notationally since they express
nodes in terms of choices. Symmetrically, simple forms are less flexible but more
efficient notationally since they express choices in terms of nodes.
At the two ends of the spectrum, choice-set forms and AR forms sacrifice small
amounts of generality for even more notational efficiency. In both cases, the extra
efficiency is gained by using more set theory. For example, precedence becomes set
inclusion: On the left, a choice-set form has t preceding t ] iff t ⇢ t ] , while on the
right, an AR form has t˙ preceding t˙] iff t˙ t˙] .
23

The prospect of shared alternatives (i.e., choices) is not so interesting for simple forms or AR forms
since [a] these two already leave extremely little flexibility in specifying choices because [b] they specify
choices as sets of nodes or outcomes (recall Figure 1.2’s second row). Mechanically, the two disallow
shared alternatives since [i] p(ĉ) (if nonempty) is the unique information set associated with the simple
choice ĉ, and [ii] Ṗ(ċ) (if nonempty) is the unique information set associated with the AR choice ċ.
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As the last sentence suggests, the two spectrum ends are opposites in some sense.
On the spectrum’s left, nodes are expressed in terms of choices (see Figure 1.2’s
top row). Since that is done in terms of past choices, the notation looks backward
more efficiently. For example, it can be relatively easy [a] to find the product of the
probabilities of past choices, [b] to sum the rewards and costs from past choices, or
[c] to sum the infinite relative likelihoods of past choices (Streufert 2015a Sections
3.3 and 4.1). In contrast, on the spectrum’s right, nodes and choices are expressed
in terms of outcomes (see Figure 1.2’s top rows). Since outcomes are in the future,
this notation looks forward more efficiently. For example, it can be relatively easy [a]
to abstractly analyze preferences over outcomes without even referring to the time
horizon (Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger 2016b), or [b] to connect game forms with the
standard statistical foundations of stochastic processes.
Although it is natural to have a favourite game specification, there appears to be
no objective sense in which one game specification is best for all purposes. Thus it
may be advantageous to be fluent in several specifications, so as to be able to freely
choose the specification that best fits the purpose at hand.

A Proofs
Lemma A.1 Suppose T is a collection of finite subsets t of C. Then, for any s ✓ C,
(a) there is an infinite chain T ⇤ in T such that [T ⇤ = s iff (b) there is (t m )m 1 2 T •
such that (8m 1) t m ⇢ t m+1 and [m 1t m = s.
Proof The reverse direction is proved by setting T ⇤ = {t m |m 1}.
To prove the forward direction, take any s and assume T ⇤ is an infinite chain in
T such that [T ⇤ = s. Define (t m )m 1 recursively by t 1 = min T ⇤ and (8m 2) t m =
min T ⇤ r{t 1 ,t 2 , ...t m 1 }. Every step in this infinite recursion is well-defined because
[a] T ⇤ is infinite by assumption and [b] every nonempty subcollection of T ⇤ has a
minimum because T ⇤ is a chain of finite sets by assumption. By inspection, (8m 1)
t m ⇢ t m+1 . Thus it remains to show [m 1t m = s. Note that [m 1t m ✓ [T ⇤ = s, where
the set inclusion holds by (8m 1) t m 2 T ⇤ , and where the equality holds by assumption. Conversely, the next two paragraphs show s ✓ [m 1t m .
This paragraph shows by induction that (8m 0) m  |t m+1 |. The initial step (m =
0) is 0  |t 1 |, which holds trivially. The inductive step (m 1) is m = (m 1)+1 
|t m |+1  |t m+1 |, where the first inequality holds by the inductive hypothesis and the
second inequality holds by t m ⇢ t m+1 .
Finally take any c 2 s. Since s = [T ⇤ by assumption, there exists some t ⇤ 2 T ⇤
⇤
such that c 2 t ⇤ . Consider the element t |t |+1 in the sequence (t m )m 1 . Since both t ⇤
⇤
⇤
⇤
and t |t |+1 belong to T ⇤ , and since T ⇤ is a chain, either t ⇤ ✓ t |t |+1 or t ⇤ t |t |+1 . The
⇤
latter would imply |t ⇤ | > |t |t |+1 |. Since this would contradict the previous paragraph
⇤
⇤
(at m = |t ⇤ |), it must be that t ⇤ ✓ t |t |+1 . Hence c 2 t ⇤ ✓ t |t |+1 ✓ [m 1t m .
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Lemma A.2 Suppose (C, N̄) is an OR tree. Further suppose s̄ 2 C• is such that
(8k 1)(9m k) 1 s̄m 2 T̄ .24 Then s̄ 2 N̄.
Proof Because of [OR3], it suffices to show that (8k 1) 1 s̄k 2 T̄ . Toward this end,
take any k 1. By assumption, there exists m k such that 1 s̄m 2 T̄ . Thus by [OR2],
1 s̄k 2 T̄ .
Lemma A.3 Consider an OR form with no shared alternatives. Then [i2I H¯i =
{ {t¯2T̄ |c2Ct¯}6=? | c2C }.
Proof Claim 1: Suppose [1] H̄ 2 H¯i , [2] t¯⇤ 2 H̄, and [3] c⇤ 2 Ct¯⇤ . Then H̄ = { t¯2T̄ |
c⇤ 2Ct¯ }. For ✓, note [1], [OR4], and [OR5] imply H̄ ✓ T̄ . So take t¯0 2 H̄. Then [2],
[3], and [OR6] imply c⇤ 2 Ct¯0 . Hence t¯0 2 {t¯2T̄ |c⇤ 2Ct¯}. For ◆, take t¯ 2 T̄ such that
c⇤ 2 Ct¯. Then [2], [3], and the assumption of no shared alternatives imply t¯ 2 H̄.
Main Argument. For ✓. Suppose H̄ 2 H¯i . Then [OR4] and [OR5] imply that
? 6= H̄ ✓ X̄. Hence there exists t¯⇤ 2 H̄ ✓ X̄. Since t¯⇤ 2 X̄, there exists c⇤ 2 Ct¯⇤ . Since
H̄ is nonempty, it suffices to show H̄ = {t¯2T̄ |c⇤ 2Ct¯}. This follows from Claim 1.
For ◆. Take any c⇤ 2 C and assume {t¯2T̄ |c⇤ 2Ct¯} 6= ?. By nonemptiness, there exists t¯⇤ such that c⇤ 2 Ct¯⇤ . Thus t¯⇤ 2 X. Thus by [OR4] and [OR5], there exists i 2 I
and H̄ 2 H¯i such that t¯⇤ 2 H̄. Hence H̄ = {t¯2T̄ |c⇤ 2Ct¯} by Claim 1.
Lemma A.4 Consider an OR form with no shared alternatives. Then (a) there is
no absentmindedness iff (b) (8n̄2N̄, t¯2T̄ ) |{k 1|n̄k 2Ct¯}|  1 iff (c) (8t¯2T̄ ) |R(t¯)| =
K(t¯).
Proof Not (a) ) not (b). Assume absentmindedness. Then there exist H̄ 2 [i2I H¯i ,
t¯ 2 H̄, and ` < K(t¯) such that 1t¯` 2 H̄. Since ` < K(t¯), t¯`+1 is well-defined and satisfies
t¯`+1 2C1 t¯` . Thus since 1t¯` and t¯ share an information set, [OR6] implies t¯`+1 2Ct¯. Thus
n̄ = t¯ (t¯`+1 ) is well-defined. Then [a] |{k 1|n̄k 2C1 t¯` }| is at least |{k 1|n̄k =t¯`+1 }|
by t¯`+1 2 C1 t¯` ; which [b] is at least |{ `+1, K(t¯)+1 }| by the construction of n̄; which
[c] equals 2 by ` < K(t¯).
Not (b) ) not (c). Let n̄ 2 N̄ and t¯ 2 T̄ be such that |{k 1|n̄k 2Ct¯}| 2. Then there
are ` and k such that ` < k and {n̄` , n̄k } ✓ Ct¯. Thus t¯ belongs to both {t¯2T̄ |n̄` 2Ct¯}
and {t¯2T̄ |n̄k 2Ct¯}. These are information sets by Lemma A.3. Since these two information sets intersect, [OR4] and [OR5] imply that the two are equal. Note that 1 n̄k 1
belongs to the latter. Thus it belongs to the former. In other words, n̄` 2 C1 n̄k 1 . Thus
t¯⇤ = 1 n̄k 1 (n̄` ) is well-defined. Since ` < k, t¯`⇤ is well-defined and equals n̄` . Since
` < k and both t¯`⇤ and t¯k⇤ equal n̄` , |R(t¯⇤ )| < K(t¯⇤ ).
Not (c) ) not (a). Suppose |R(t¯)| 6= K(t¯). Thus since |R(t¯)| > K(t¯) is inconceivable, |R(t¯)| < K(t¯). Thus there are indices 1  ` < k  K(t¯) such that t¯` = t¯k . Since [a]
t¯` 2 C1 t¯` 1 , [b] t¯k 2 C1 t¯k 1 , and [c] t¯` = t¯k , both 1t¯` 1 and 1t¯k 1 belong to {t¯2T̄ |t¯k 2Ct¯}.
By Lemma A.3, this is an information set. Since ` < k, the last two sentences imply
that this information set contains both 1t¯` 1 and its successor 1t¯k 1 .
24 In the text, a sequence is denoted by n̄ = (c )K
k k=1 for some K 2 {0, 1, 2, ...}[{•}, and an initial segment is denoted by (ck )Lk=1 for some L < K (this resembles notation from Osborne and Rubinstein 1994).
In this appendix, the elements of a sequence n̄ are denoted n̄k rather than ck , the length of a sequence is
denoted K(n̄) 2 {0, 1, 2, ...}[{•}, and an initial segment is denoted 1 n̄` = (n̄1 , n̄2 , ... n̄` ) for some ` < K(n̄).
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Lemma A.5 (Establishes Proposition 3.0 and slightly more.) Consider an OR form
with no shared alternatives. Then (a) there is no absentmindedness iff (b) R|T̄ is
injective iff (c) R|N̄ is injective.
Proof Not (a) ) not (b). Suppose there is absentmindedness. Then Lemma A.4
(a,c) implies there is a sequence t¯ such that |R(t¯)| 6= K(t¯). Since |R(t¯)| > K(t¯) is
inconceivable, |R(t¯)| < K(t¯). Thus there exist indices 1  ` < k  K(t¯) such that
t¯` = t¯k . Hence R(1t¯k 1 ) = R(1t¯k ).
Not (b) ) not (c). This is obvious since T̄ ✓ N̄.
Not (c) ) not (a). Assume that n̄1 and n̄2 are distinct elements of N̄ such that
1
R(n̄ ) = R(n̄2 ).
On the one hand, suppose there does not exist a k 1 such that n̄1k 6= n̄2k . Then
1
2
1
n̄ = 1 n̄K(
or n̄2 = 1 n̄K(
. Without loss of generality, assume the former. Since
n̄1 )
n̄2 )
n̄1 6= n̄2 by assumption, n̄2K(n̄1 )+1 exists. Thus since R(n̄1 ) = R(n̄2 ) by assumption,

K(n̄1 ) 6= 0 and there exists some `  K(n̄1 ) such that n̄1` = n̄2K(n̄1 )+1 . But the assump2
tion n̄1 = 1 n̄K(
implies n̄1` = n̄2` , and thus the last sentence implies n̄2` = n̄2K(n̄1 )+1 .
n̄1 )

This and `  K(n̄1 ) imply |R(1 n̄2K(n̄1 )+1 )| < K(1 n̄2K(n̄1 )+1 ). This implies absentmindedness by Lemma A.4(a,c).
On the other hand, suppose there exists a k 1 such that n̄1k 6= n̄2k . Then let ` be
the smallest such k. Then [a] 1 n̄`1 1 = 1 n̄`2 1 and [b] n̄1` 6= n̄2` . Since n̄1` 2 C n̄ 1 and
n̄2` 2 C

[a] implies [c] {n̄1` , n̄2` } ✓ C

1 ` 1

1
2
1 . Further, [b] and R(n̄ ) = R(n̄ ) imply
1 n̄` 1
the existence of some `⇤ 6= ` such that n̄1`⇤ = n̄2` . This and [c] imply {n̄1` , n̄1`⇤ } ✓ C n̄ 1 .
1 ` 1
This and `⇤ 6= ` imply |{k0 1|n̄1k0 2Ct¯}| 2 for t¯ = 1 n̄`1 1 . This implies absentmind2 ,
1 n̄` 1

edness by Lemma A.4(a,b).

Lemma A.6 Consider an OR form with no shared alternatives and no absentmindedness. Assume R(t¯[ ) ✓ R(t¯). Then K(t¯[ )  K(t¯) and t¯[ = 1t¯K(t¯[ ) .
Proof Note that K(t¯[ ) = |R(t¯[ )|  |R(t¯)| = K(t¯), where the equalities hold by two applications of Lemma A.4(a,c), and where the inequality holds because R(t¯[ ) ✓ R(t¯).
This is the first of the lemma’s two conclusions. For the second conclusion, it suffices
[
to show that 1t¯K(
= 1t¯K(t¯[ ) . For this, it suffices that the next two paragraphs show,
t¯ [ )

by induction on k 2 {1, 2, ... K(t¯[ )}, that (8kK(t¯[ )) 1t¯k[ = 1t¯k .
For the initial step at k = 1, suppose that t¯1[ 6= t¯1 . Note [a] {t¯1[ , t¯1 } ✓ C{} . Also,
R(t¯[ ) ✓ R(t¯) implies there is [b] ` > 1 such that [c] t¯1[ = t¯` . [a] and [c] imply that
{t¯` , t¯1 } ✓ C{} . This and [b] imply that |{k 1|t¯k 2C{} }| 2. This is inconsistent with
no absentmindedness by Lemma A.4(a,b).
For the inductive step at k 2 {2, 3, ... K(t¯[ )}, suppose [1] 1t¯k[ 1 = 1t¯k 1 and [2]
t¯k[ 6= t¯k . Since t¯k[ 2 C t¯[ and t¯k 2 C1 t¯k 1 , [1] implies [3] {t¯k[ , t¯k } ✓ C1 t¯k 1 . Also, since
1k 1

R(t¯[ ) ✓ R(t¯), [2] implies there is [4] ` 6= k such that [5] t¯k[ = t¯` . [3] and [5] imply
{t¯` , t¯k } ✓ C1 t¯k 1 . This and [4] imply |{k0 1|t¯k0 2C1 t¯k 1 }| 2. This is inconsistent with
no absentmindedness by Lemma A.4(a,b).
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Proof A.7 (for Theorem 3.1: choice-set OR) (a). Claims 2, 7, and 9 show that
(C, N) is a choice-set tree by deriving [cs1], [cs2], and [cs3]. Further, Claim 1 shows
that R|N̄ is a bijection from N̄ to N.
Claim 1: R|N̄ is a bijection from N̄ onto N. By the theorem’s definition of N, R|N̄
is surjective. By Proposition 3.0, R|N̄ is injective.
Claim 2: [cs1] holds. By [OR1], N̄ is a nonempty collection of sequences in C.
Thus by the definition of N, N is a nonempty collection of subsets of C.
Claim 3: R|T̄ is a bijection from T̄ onto T . Because of Claim 1 and the fact that
T̄ ✓ N̄, it suffices to show that {R(t¯)|t¯2T̄ } = T . To show the ✓ direction, take any
t¯ 2 T̄ . By the definition of N, R(t¯) 2 N. Further, |R(t¯)|  K(t¯) < • because t¯ 2 T̄ . By
the last two sentences, R(t¯) 2 T . To show the ◆ direction, take any [a] t 2 T . By the
definition of N, there exists n̄ such that [b] R(n̄) = t. It remains to show that n̄ 2 T̄ .
Toward that end, suppose n̄ 2
/ T̄ . Then by [OR2], (8` 1) 1 n̄` would be a well-defined
member of T̄ . Thus (8` 1) |R(n̄)| |R(1 n̄` )| = K(1 n̄` ) = `, where the first equality
holds by Lemma A.4(a,c), and where the rest holds by inspection. This implies that
|R(n̄)| is infinite. Thus [b] implies |t| is infinite. This contradicts [a].
Claim 4: (8t¯[ 2T̄ , c2C, t¯2T̄ ) t¯[ (c) = t¯ ) ( c 2
/ R(t¯[ ) and R(t¯[ )[{c} = R(t¯) ).
Suppose t¯[ (c) = t¯. This implies R(t¯[ )[{c} = R(t¯[ (c)) = R(t¯), which is the second
fact to be derived. Also |R(t¯[ )|+1 = K(t¯[ )+1 = K(t¯) = |R(t¯)| by Lemma A.4(a,c),
by t¯[ (c) = t¯, and by Lemma A.4(a,c) again. This and t¯[ (c) = t¯ yield c 2
/ R(t¯[ ),
which is the first fact to be derived.
Claim 5: (8t¯[ 2T̄ , c2C, t¯2T̄ ) t¯[ (c) = t¯ , ( c 2
/ R(t¯[ ) and R(t¯[ )[{c} = R(t¯) ).
Because of Claim 4, it suffices to show the reverse direction. Toward that end, assume
[i] c 2
/ R(t¯[ ) and [ii] R(t¯[ )[{c} = R(t¯). Note K(t¯[ ) + 1 = |R(t¯[ )| + 1 = |R(t¯)| = K(t¯)
by Lemma A.4(a,c), by [i] and [ii], and by Lemma A.4(a,c) again. So, trivially,
K(t¯[ ) = K(t¯) 1. Also, since R(t¯[ ) ✓ R(t¯[ )[{c} = R(t¯) by [ii], Lemma A.6 implies t¯[ = 1t¯K(t¯[ ) . The last two sentences yield [a] t¯[ = 1t¯K(t¯) 1 . [i] and [ii] yield [b]
R(t¯)rR(t¯[ ) ✓ {c}. [a] and [b] yield [c] t¯K(t¯) = c. [a] and [c] yield t¯[ (c) = t¯.

Claim 6: Take t 2 T r{{}}. Then (a) (R|T̄ ) 1 (t) is a well-defined sequence in
T̄ and (b) (8c2C) c = [(R|T̄ ) 1 (t)]K((R|T̄ ) 1 (t)) iff c2t and t r{c}2T . (a) holds by
Claim 3. For (b), take c 2 C. I argue c = [(R|T̄ ) 1 (t)]K((R|T̄ ) 1 (t)) is [1] equivalent
to (9t¯[ 2T̄ ) t¯[ (c) = (R|T̄ ) 1 (t) by inspection; which is [2] equivalent to (9t [ 2T )
(R|T̄ ) 1 (t [ ) (c) = (R|T̄ ) 1 (t) by Claim 3; which is [3] equivalent to (9t [ 2T )
c2
/ R (R|T̄ ) 1 (t [ ) and R (R|T̄ ) 1 (t [ )[{c} = R (R|T̄ ) 1 (t) by Claim 5 at t¯[ =
/ [ and
(R|T̄ ) 1 (t [ ) and t¯ = (R|T̄ ) 1 (t); which is [4] equivalent to (9t [ 2T ) c2t
[
[
t [{c}=t by manipulation; which is [5] equivalent to (9t 2T ) c2t and t r{c}=t [ by
manipulation; which is [6] equivalent to c2t and t r{c}2T .
Claim 7: [cs2] holds. Take t 6= {}. It must be shown that t has a unique last
choice. Claim 6 establishes that the last elements of the sequence (R|T̄ ) 1 (t) are
identical to the last choices (Section 2) of the set t. Since the sequence (R|T̄ ) 1 (t) is
nonempty because the set t is nonempty, the sequence has a unique last element. By
the previous two sentences, the set t has a unique last choice.
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Claim 8: N rT ✓ { [T ⇤ | T ⇤ is an infinite chain in T }. Take n 2 N rT . By the definition of N, there is n̄ 2 N̄ such that n = R(n̄). Thus, since n 2
/ T , R(n̄) is infinite. This
and n̄ 2 N̄ imply n̄ 2 N̄ rT̄ . Hence, by [OR2], we may define T ⇤ = {R(1 n̄` )|` 1}. As
required, T ⇤ ✓ T because [a] R takes N̄ to N and [b] finite sequences have finite
ranges. Further, T ⇤ is an infinite chain because [i] it is a chain by inspection and [ii]
(8` 1) |R(1 n̄` )| = ` by Lemma A.4(a,c). Finally, n equals R(n̄) by the definition
of n̄; which equals R([{1 n̄` |` 1}) by n̄ being an infinite sequence; which equals
[{R(1 n̄` )|` 1} by manipulation; which equals [T ⇤ by the definition of T ⇤ .

Claim 9: [cs3] holds. Because of Claim 8, it suffices to show that N rT ◆ { [T ⇤ |
is an infinite chain in T }. Toward that end, suppose T ⇤ is an infinite chain in T .
Because T ⇤ is an infinite chain, [T ⇤ must be an infinite set. Thus, it remains to show
that [T ⇤ 2 N. By Lemma A.1 at s = [T ⇤ , there is an infinite sequence (t m )m 1 in T
such that [a] (8m 1) t m ⇢ t m+1 and [b] [m 1t m = [T ⇤ . Further, by Claim 3, there
is an infinite sequence (t¯m )m 1 in T̄ such that [c] (8m 1) t m = R(t¯m ). [a] and [c]
imply [d] (8m 1) R(t¯m ) ⇢ R(t¯m+1 ). [d] and two applications of Lemma A.4(a,c)
yield [e] (8m 1) K(t¯m ) = |R(t¯m )| < |R(t¯m+1 )| = K(t¯m+1 ). Also, [d] and Lemma A.6
m+1
m
• and [h] (8m0 1)
yield [f] (8m 1) t¯m = 1t¯K(t
m ) . [e] and [f] imply [g] [m 1 t¯ 2 C
T⇤

m
1 ([m 1 t¯ )m0

0

0

= t¯m . [h] implies (8k 1)(9m0 k) 1 ([m 1t¯m )m0 = t¯m 2 T̄ . This, [g],
and Lemma A.2 at n̄ = [m 1t¯m imply [i] [m 1t¯m 2 N̄. So, [T ⇤ = [m 1t m by [b];
which equals [m 1 R(t¯m ) by [c]; which equals R([m 1t¯m ) by manipulation; which
belongs to {R(n̄)|n̄2N̄} by [i]; which equals N by the theorem’s definition of N.
(b). It must be shown that ([i2I Ci , N) is a choice-set tree, and that ((Ci )i2I , N)
satisfies [cs4], [cs5], and [cs6]. This is done by Claims 11, 14, 15, and 16.

Claim 10: [N ✓ [i2I Ci . By definition, N = {R(n̄)|n̄2N̄}. Thus it suffices to show
[{R(n̄)|n̄2N̄} ✓ [i2I Ci . Toward that end, take any n̄ 2 N̄ and any c 2 R(n̄). Then
there exists k 1 such that c = n̄k . Thus [a] c 2 C1 n̄k 1 . So 1 n̄k 1 2 X̄, which by
[OR4] and [OR5] implies there are i 2 I and [b] H̄ ⇤ 2 H¯i such that [c] 1 n̄k 1 2 H̄ ⇤ .
So, c 2 C1 n̄k 1 by [a]; which equals CH̄ ⇤ by [c]; which is a subset of [{CH̄ |H̄2H¯i }
by [b]; which equals Ci by the theorem’s definition of Ci .
Claim 11: ([i2I Ci , N) is a choice-set tree. By part (a), (C, N) is a choice-set tree.
Equivalently, (C, N) satisfies [cs1]–[cs3]. By inspection, these three conditions are
only concerned with the choices in [N. So, if C0 is any superset of [N, then (C0 , N)
satisfies [cs1]–[cs3]. Thus, by Claim 10, ([i2I Ci , N) satisfies [cs1]–[cs3].
Claim 12: (8t¯2T̄ ) Ct¯ = CR(t¯) . Take any t¯. I argue Ct¯ [a] equals { c2C | t¯ (c)2T }
by the (OR) definition of Ct¯; which [b] equals { c2C | (9t¯] 2T̄ ) t¯ (c)=t¯] } by rearrangement; which [c] equals { c2C | (9t¯] 2T̄ ) c2R(
/ t¯) and R(t¯)[{c}=R(t¯] ) } by
Claim 5; which [d] equals { c2C | c2R(
/ t¯) and R(t¯)[{c}2T } because R|T̄ is onto T
by Claim 3; which [e] equals CR(t¯) by the (choice-set) definition of CR(t¯) .
Claim 13: R|X̄ is a bijection from X̄ onto X. By Claim 3 and the fact that X̄ ✓ T̄ ,
it suffices to show that {R(t¯)|t¯2X̄} = X. For the ✓ direction, suppose t¯ 2 X̄. Then
Ct¯ 6= ?. Thus by Claim 12, CR(t¯) 6= ?. Hence R(t¯) 2 X. Conversely, suppose t 2 X.
By Claim 3, there exists t¯ 2 T̄ such that R(t¯) = t. Thus it suffices to show t¯ 2 X̄. Since
R(t¯) = t and t 2 X, CR(t¯) 6= ?. Thus by Claim 12, Ct¯ 6= ?. Hence t¯ 2 X̄.
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Claim 14: [cs4] holds. Suppose there were cA 2 [iCi and cB 2 [i2I Ci such that
{t2X|cA 2Ct } and {t2X|cB 2Ct } were unequal but intersecting. Then, without loss
of generality, assume that t 2 is in both sets and that t 1 is in the former but not the
latter. Then t 1 2 X and t 2 2 X are such that {cA , cB } ✓ Ct 2 , cA 2 Ct 1 , and cB 2
/ Ct 1 . By
Claim 13 and X̄ ✓ T̄ , there exist t¯1 and t¯2 in T̄ such that R(t¯1 ) = t 1 and R(t¯2 ) = t 2 .
Thus by the second-previous sentence and Claim 12, {cA , cB } ✓ Ct¯2 , cA 2 Ct¯1 , and
cB 2
/ Ct¯1 . Thus t¯2 is in both {t¯2T̄ |cA 2Ct¯} and {t¯2T̄ |cB 2Ct¯}, while t¯1 is in the former
but not the latter. Therefore, since these two sets belong to [i2I H¯i by Lemma A.3,
[i2I H¯i is not pairwise disjoint. This contradicts [OR4] and [OR5].

Claim 15: [cs5] holds. Suppose there were i 2 I, j 2 I r{i}, and c 2 Ci \C j . By
the theorem’s definition of Ci , there is H̄i 2 H¯i such that c 2 CH̄i . Similarly there is
H̄ j 2 H¯j such that c 2 CH̄ j . Note [i] c 2 CH̄i \CH̄ j . Yet, H̄i ✓ P̄ 1 (i) and H̄ j ✓ P̄ 1 ( j)
by [OR5]. This implies H̄i 6= H̄ j because P̄ 1 (i)\P̄ 1 ( j) = ? by [OR4]. Thus [ii]
CH̄i \CH̄ j = ? by the assumption of no shared alternatives. [i] and [ii] contradict.
Claim 16: [cs6] holds. Take any t 2 X. By Claim 13, there exists [1] t¯ 2 X̄ such
that [2] R(t¯) = t. [1] and [OR4] imply there is i such that t¯ 2 P 1 (i). This and [OR5]
imply there is [3] H̄ ⇤ 2 H¯i such that t¯ 2 H̄ ⇤ . So by [OR6], [4] Ct¯ = CH̄ ⇤ . Hence
Ct equals Ct¯ by [2] and Claim 12; which equals CH̄ ⇤ by [4]; which is a subset of
[{CH̄ |H̄2H¯i } by [3]; which equals Ci by the theorem’s definition of Ci .

Proof A.8 (for Theorem 3.2: choice-set ! OR) Definition of C, c⇤ , and (Tk )k 0 .
First, let C = [i2I Ci . Second, [cs2] implies the existence of a function c⇤ :T r{{}}!C
that takes each nonempty t 2 T to its unique last choice c⇤ (t). Third, define (Tk )k 0
by Tk = {t2T | |t|=k }. Note T = [k 0 Tk . Also note T0 = {{}} by note 5.
Definition of (Qk )k 0 . This paragraph recursively defines a sequence (Qk )k 0 of
surjective functions which map choice sets to choice sequences. More precisely, each
Qk will map each t 2 Tk to some finite sequence in C. To begin, define the oneelement function Q0 :T0 !Q0 (T0 ) by Q0 ({}) = {}. Note that the codomain of Q0 has
been set equal to its range Q0 (T0 ) = {{}}. Then, for any k 1, use Qk 1 to define
Qk :Tk !Qk (Tk ) by Qk (t) = Qk 1 (t r{c⇤ (t)}) (c⇤ (t)). Note that Qk is well-defined at
each t 2 Tk because [a] t r{c⇤ (t)} 2 Tk 1 by [cs2] and [b] Tk 1 is the domain of the
function Qk 1 which was defined in the last step of the recursion. Also note that the
codomain of Qk has been set equal to its range Qk (Tk ).
Definition of N̄. Define N̄ = [k 0 Qk (Tk ) [ { s̄2C• | (8` 0) 1 s̄` 2 [k 0 Qk (Tk ) },
where C• denotes the set of all infinite sequences in C.
Claim 1: [OR1] holds. By inspection, N̄ consists of sequences in C. Further, N̄ is
nonempty because [a] Q({}) = {} is an element of Q0 (T0 ) by the definition of Q0 ,
and [b] Q0 (T0 ) ✓ N̄ by the definition of N̄.
Claim 2: [OR2] holds for K = •. Suppose s̄ 2 N̄\C• . Since s̄ is infinite and
[k 0 Qk (Tk ) consists of finite sequences, s̄ 2
/ [k 0 Qk (Tk ). Thus the ✓ half of the
definition of N̄ implies (8` 0) 1 s̄` 2 [k 0 Qk (Tk ). This implies (8` 0) 1 s̄` 2 N̄ since
[k 0 Qk (Tk ) ✓ N̄ by the ◆ half of the definition of N̄.
Claim 3: [OR3] holds. Suppose s̄ 2 C• satisfies (8` 0) 1 s̄` 2 N̄. Since each 1 s̄` is
finite, the ✓ half of the definition of N̄ implies that (8` 0) 1 s̄` 2 [k 0 Qk (Tk ). Thus
the ◆ half of the definition of N̄ implies s̄ 2 N̄.
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Claim 4: T̄ = [k 0 Qk (Tk ). Section 3.1 defines T̄ to be the collection of finite
sequences in N̄. Thus the claim holds by inspecting the definition of N̄.
Claim 5: (8k 0,t2Tk ) K(Qk (t)) = k. This can be shown by induction. The initial
step (k = 0) holds because T0 = {{}} by the definition of T0 , and because K(Q0 ({}))
= K({}) = 0 by the definition of Q0 . The inductive step (k 1) holds because for
any t 2 Tk , K( Qk (t) ) equals K( Qk 1 (t r{c⇤ (t)}) (c⇤ (t)) ) by the definition of Qk ,
which equals K( Qk 1 (t r{c⇤ (t)}) ) + 1 by inspection. This equals (k 1) + 1 by [a]
the inductive hypothesis and [b] the fact that t r{c⇤ (t)} 2 Tk 1 by t 2 Tk and [cs2].
Finally, (k 1) + 1 = k.
Claim 6: (8k 0) Qk (Tk ) = { t¯2T̄ | K(t¯)=k }. Fix k 0. The ✓ direction follows
from Claim 5 at k. Conversely, take any [a] t¯ 2 T̄ such that [b] K(t¯) = k. By [a] and
the ✓ direction of Claim 4, there are k0 0 and [c] t 0 2 Tk0 such that [d] t¯ = Qk0 (t 0 ).
Note K(t¯) equals K(Qk0 (t 0 )) by [d]; which equals k0 by [c] and Claim 5 at k0 . This and
[b] imply k = k0 . This, [c], and [d] imply t¯ 2 Qk (Tk ).
Claim 7: (8t¯2T̄ r{{}}) 1t¯K(t¯) 1 2 T̄ . Fix t¯ 2 T̄ r{{}}. Note t¯ 2 QK(t¯) (TK(t¯) ) by
Claim 6. Thus there is t 2 TK(t¯) such that t¯ = QK(t¯) (t). Since t¯ 6= {} by assumption,
K(t¯) 1. The last two sentences and the definition of QK(t¯) imply t¯ = QK(t¯) (t) =
QK(t) 1 (t r{c⇤ (t)}) (c⇤ (t)). I argue [a] 1t¯K(t¯) 1 = QK(t) 1 (t r{c⇤ (t)}) by the previous sentence; which [b] belongs to QK(t) 1 (TK(t) 1 ) by t 2 TK(t¯) and [cs2]; which [c]
is a subset of T̄ by Claim 4.
Claim 8: ([i2I Ci , N̄) is an OR tree. Because of Claims 1–3, it suffices to show
that [OR2] holds for K < •. Toward that end, take any n̄ 2 N̄ and any ` 0 such that
` < K(n̄) < •. By K(n̄) < • and the definition of T̄ , n̄ 2 T̄ . Thus 1 n̄` belongs to T̄ by
K(t¯) ` applications of Claim 7; which is a subset of N̄ by the definition of T̄ .
Claim 9: (a) [k 0 Qk : T !T̄ is well-defined and (b) (8t2T ) ([k 0 Qk )(t) = Q|t| (t).
Take t 2 T . The definition of (Tk )k 0 implies [1] t 2 T|t| and [2] (Tk )k 0 partitions
T . [1] and [2] imply ([k 0 Qk )(t) is [3] well-defined and [4] equal to Q|t| (t). Also,
([k 0 Qk )(t) equals Q|t| (t) by [4]; which belongs to Q|t| (T|t| ) by [1]; which is a subset
of T̄ by Claim 4. (a) follows from [3] and the previous sentence. (b) follows from [4].
Claim 10: (8k 0,t2Tk ) R(Qk (t)) = t. This can be shown by induction. The initial
step (k = 0) holds because T0 = {{}} by the definition of T0 and because R(Q0 ({})) =
R({}) = {} by the definition of Q0 . To see the inductive step, take any k 1 and any
t 2 Tk . Then R( Qk (t) ) [a] equals R Qk 1 (t r{c⇤ (t)}) (c⇤ (t)) by the definition of
Qk , which [b] equals R Qk 1 (t r{c⇤ (t)}) [ {c⇤ (t)} by inspection, which [c] equals
t r{c⇤ (t)} [ {c⇤ (t)} by the inductive hypothesis, which [d] equals t.

Claim 11: R|T̄ : T̄ !T is the inverse of [k 0 Qk . Claim 10 implies that (8k 0)
R|Qk (Tk ) = Qk 1 and that it maps from Qk (Tk ) onto Tk . Claim 6 implies that the members of {Qk (Tk )|k 0} are disjoint. The definition of (Tk )k 0 implies that the members
of {Tk |k 0} are disjoint. The last three sentences imply that R|[k Qk (Tk ) = ([k 0 Qk ) 1
and that it maps from [k 0 Qk (Tk ) onto [k 0 Tk . This is equivalent to the claim because [a] [k 0 Qk (Tk ) = T̄ by Claim 4 and because [b] [k 0 Tk = T by the definition
of (Tk )k 0 .
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Claim 12: (8k 1,t [ 2Tk 1 , c2C,t2Tk ) Qk 1 (t [ ) (c) = Qk (t) iff both c 2
/ t [ and
t [ [{c} = t. Take any such k, t [ , c, and t. I argue [a] Qk 1 (t [ ) (c) = Qk (t) is equivalent to Qk 1 (t [ ) (c) = Qk 1 (t r{c⇤ (t)}) (c⇤ (t)) by the definition of Qk ; which [b]
is equivalent to the combination of Qk 1 (t [ )=Qk 1 (t r{c⇤ (t)}) and c=c⇤ (t) by rearrangement; which [c] is equivalent to t [ =t r{c⇤ (t)} and c=c⇤ (t) by applying R to both
sides of the first equality and then simplifying it via Claim 11; which [d] is equivalent to t [ =t r{c}, c2t, and c=c⇤ (t); which [e] is equivalent to t [ =t r{c} and c2t since
t [ 2T by assumption; which [f] is equivalent to c2t
/ [ and t [ [{c}=t by rearrangement.
Claim 13: (8t [ 2T, c2C,t2T ) ([k 0 Qk )(t [ ) (c) = ([k 0 Qk )(t) iff both c 2
/ t[
[
[
[
and t [{c} = t. Take t , c, and t. By Claim 9(b) it suffices to show [a] Q|t [ | (t ) (c) =

Q|t| (t) is equivalent to [b] c 2
/ t [ and t [ [{c} = t together. For the forward direction,
assume [a]. Two applications of Claim 6 imply K(Q|t [ | (t [ )) = |t [ | and K(Q|t| (t)) = |t|.

This and [a] imply |t| 1 and |t [ | = |t| 1. Hence [a] and the forward direction
of Claim 12 at k = |t| imply [b]. Conversely, assume [b]. [b] implies |t| 1 and
|t [ | = |t| 1. Hence [b] and the reverse direction of Claim 12 at k = |t| imply [a].
Claim 14: (8t¯[ 2T̄ , c2C, t¯2T̄ ) t¯[ (c) = t¯ iff both c 2
/ R(t¯[ ) and R(t¯[ )[{c} = R(t¯).
Take any t¯[ , c, and t¯. By Claim 11, t¯[ (c) = t¯ is equivalent to ([k 0 Qk ) R(t¯[ ) (c) =
([k 0 Qk ) R(t¯). This, in turn, is equivalent to the combination of c 2
/ R(t¯[ ) and
R(t¯[ )[{c} = R(t¯) by Claim 13 applied at t [ = R(t¯[ ) and t = R(t¯).
Claim 15: (8t¯2T̄ ) Ct¯ = CR(t¯) . Take any t¯. I argue Ct¯ [a] equals { c2C | t¯ (c)2T̄ }
by the (OR) definition of Ct¯; which [b] equals { c2C | (9t¯] 2T̄ ) t¯ (c)=t¯] } by rearrangement; which [c] equals { c2C | (9t¯] 2T̄ ) c2R(
/ t¯) and R(t¯)[{c}=R(t¯] ) } by
Claim 14; which equals [d] { c2C | c2R(
/ t¯) and R(t¯)[{c}2T } because the R|T̄ is onto
T by Claim 11; which [e] equals CR(t¯) by the (choice-set) definition of CR(t¯) .
Claim 16: R|X̄ is a bijection from X̄ onto X. Because of X̄ ✓ T̄ and Claim 11,
it suffices to show that {R(t¯)|t¯2X̄} = X. For the ✓ direction, suppose t¯ 2 X̄. Then
Ct¯ 6= ?. Thus by Claim 15, CR(t¯) 6= ?. Hence R(t¯) 2 X. Conversely, suppose t 2 X.
By Claim 11, there exists t¯ 2 T̄ such that R(t¯) = t. Thus it suffices to show t¯ 2 X̄.
Since R(t¯) = t and t 2 X, CR(t¯) 6= ?. Thus by Claim 15, Ct¯ 6= ?. Hence t¯ 2 X̄.

Claim 17: P̄ is well-defined and [OR4] holds. It suffices to show P̄:X̄!I is welldefined. This is equivalent to (8t¯2X̄)(9!i2I) Ct¯ ✓ Ci . By Claim 15, this is equivalent to (8t¯2X̄)(9!i2I) CR(t¯) ✓ Ci . By Claim 16, this is equivalent to (8t2X)(9!i2I)
Ct ✓ Ci . To show this, take t 2 X. [cs6] implies there is an i 2 I such that Ct ✓ Ci .
[cs5] implies that this i is unique since [i] Ct 6= ? since [ii] t 2 X.
Claim 18: (8c2[i2I Ci ) { R(t¯) | t¯2X̄, c2Ct¯ } = {t2X | c2Ct }. Take any c. For the
✓ direction, take any t¯ 2 X̄ such that c 2 Ct¯. Note t¯ 2 X̄ and Claim 16 imply R(t¯) 2 X.
Further, c 2 Ct¯ and Claim 15 imply c 2 CR(t¯) . The previous two sentences imply
R(t¯) 2 {t2X | c2Ct }. Conversely, take any t 2 X such that c 2 Ct . Note t 2 X and
Claim 16 imply the existence of a t¯ 2 X̄ such that t = R(t¯). Further, [a] c 2 Ct by
assumption; which [b] equals CR(t¯) by the previous sentence; which [c] equals Ct¯ by
Claim 15. The previous two sentences imply t 2 { R(t¯) | t¯2X̄, c2Ct¯ }.
Claim 19: [OR5] holds. Take i 2 I. It must be shown that H¯i partitions P̄ 1 (i).
By definition, H¯i = { {t¯2X̄|c2Ct¯} 6= ? | c2Ci } and P̄ 1 (i) = { t¯2X̄ |Ct¯✓Ci }. [1] By
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inspection, each member of H¯i is nonempty. [2] By Claim 11, { {t¯2X̄|c2Ct¯} 6= ? |
c2Ci } is pairwise disjoint iff { {R(t¯) | t¯2X̄, c2Ct¯} 6= ? | c2Ci } is pairwise disjoint. By
Claim 18, this holds iff { {t2X|c2Ct } 6= ? | c2Ci } is pairwise disjoint. This is implied
by [cs4]. [3] It remains to show that [{ {t¯2X̄|c2Ct¯} 6= ? | c2Ci } = { t¯2X̄ |Ct¯✓Ci }.
For the ✓ direction, take any c 2 Ci and any t¯ 2 X̄ such that c 2 Ct¯. It suffices to
show that Ct¯ ✓ Ci . Since c 2 Ct¯\Ci , [cs5] implies that there cannot be a j 2 I r{i}
such that Ct¯ ✓ C j . Thus [cs6] implies Ct¯ ✓ Ci . Conversely, take any t¯⇤ 2 X̄ such that
Ct¯⇤ ✓ Ci . Then arbitrarily choose any c⇤ 2 Ct¯⇤ . So t¯⇤ 2 {t¯2X̄|c⇤ 2Ct¯} and this set is
in the collection { {t¯2X̄|c2Ct¯}6=? | c2Ci } because c⇤ 2 Ct¯⇤ ✓ Ci .
Claim 20: h([i2I Ci , N̄), (P̄, (H¯i )i2I )i is a well-defined OR form. ([i2I Ci , N̄) is an
OR tree by Claim 8. P̄ is well-defined and [OR4] holds by Claim 17. [OR5] holds
by Claim 19. Thus it remains to show [OR6]. Toward that end, suppose that t¯1 and
t¯2 belong to the (OR) information set { t¯2X̄ | c2Ct¯ }. Then R(t¯1 ) and R(t¯2 ) belong to
{ R(t¯) | t¯2X̄, c2Ct¯ }. Thus Claim 18 implies R(t¯1 ) and (t¯2 ) belong to the (choice-set)
information set {t2X | c2Ct }. Thus note 7 (Section 2) implies CR(t¯1 ) = CR(t¯2 ) . Thus
Claim 15 implies Ct¯1 = Ct¯2 .
Claim 21: (8c2[i2I Ci , H̄2[i2I H¯i ) c 2 CH̄ iff H̄ = { t¯2X̄ | c2Ct¯ }. Take c and H̄.
For the reverse direction, assume H̄ = { t¯2X̄ | c2Ct¯ }. By inspection, (8t¯2H̄) c 2 Ct¯.
Hence c 2 CH̄ by the usual definition of CH̄ . For the forward direction, suppose
c 2 CH̄ . Then the definition of CH̄ implies (8t¯2H̄) c 2 Ct¯. This implies (8t¯2H̄) t¯ 2 X̄.
By the last two sentences, H̄ ✓ { t¯2X̄ | c2Ct¯ }. Further, H̄ is an information set by
assumption, and { t¯2X̄ | c2Ct¯ } is an information set by the theorem’s definition of
(H¯i )i2I . Since the information sets partition X̄ by [OR4] and [OR5], Claim 20 and
the previous two sentences imply H̄ = { t¯2X̄ | c2Ct¯ }.
Claim 22: h([i2I Ci , N̄), (P̄, (H¯i )i2I )i is an OR form with no shared alternatives.
Given Claim 20, it remains to show that there are no shared alternatives. Toward
that end, suppose there were H 1 2 [i2I H¯i , H 2 2 [i2I H¯i , and c⇤ 2 [i2I Ci such that
c⇤ 2 CH̄ 1 \CH̄ 2 . Then by Claim 21, both H̄ 1 and H̄ 2 would equal {t¯2X̄|c⇤ 2Ct¯}. Hence
H̄ 1 would equal H̄ 2 .
Claim 23: h([i2I Ci , N̄), (P̄, (H¯i )i2I )i is an OR form with no shared alternatives
and no absentmindedness. Because of Claim 22, it suffices to show that there is no
absentmindedness. This follows from Claim 22, Claim 11, and Lemma A.5(a,b).
Claim 24: (8n̄2N̄ rT̄ ) {R(1 n̄` )|` 1} is an infinite chain in T . Take any such n̄.
(1) By Claim 23 and [OR2], {1 n̄` |` 1} ✓ T̄ . Thus by Claim 11, {R(1 n̄` )|` 1} ✓ T .
(2) Note that (8` 1) R(1 n̄` ) ✓ R(1 n̄`+1 ) simply because each 1 n̄` ✓ 1 n̄`+1 . Hence
{R(1 n̄` )|` 1} is a chain. (3) Claim 23 and Lemma A.4(a,c) imply that (8` 1)
|R(1 n̄` )| = `. Hence {R(1 n̄` )|` 1} is infinite.
Claim 25: {R(n̄)|n̄2N̄} ✓ N. Claim 11 yields {R(t¯)|t¯2T̄ } = T ✓ N. Thus it suffices to show {R(n̄)|n̄2N̄ rT̄ } ✓ N. Toward that end, take n̄ 2 N̄ rT̄ . Since n̄ is infinite,
n̄ = [{1 n̄` |` 1}. So [a] R(n̄) = R([{1 n̄` |` 1}); which [b] equals [{R(1 n̄` )|` 1} by
rearrangement; which [c] belongs to N by Claim 24 and the reverse direction of [cs3].
Claim 26: {R(n̄)|n̄2N̄} ◆ N rT . Take any n 2 N rT . By the forward direction of
[cs3], there exists an infinite chain T ⇤ ✓ T such that [T ⇤ = n. Thus by Lemma A.1,
there is an infinite sequence (t m )m 1 in T such that [a] (8m 1) t m ⇢ t m+1 and [b]
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[m 1t m = [T ⇤ . Further, by Claim 11, there is an infinite sequence (t¯m )m 1 in T̄
such that [c] (8m 1) t m = R(t¯m ). [a] and [c] imply [d] (8m 1) R(t¯m ) ⇢ R(t¯m+1 ).
[d], Claim 23, and two applications of Lemma A.4(a,c) yield [e] (8m 1) K(t¯m ) =
|R(t¯m )| < |R(t¯m+1 )| = K(t¯m+1 ). Also, [d], Claim 23, and Lemma A.6 yield that [f]
m+1
m
•
0 1)
(8m 1) t¯m = 1t¯K(t
m ) . [e] and [f] imply that [g] [m 1 t¯ 2 ([i2I Ci ) and [h] (8m
m
1 ([m 1 t¯ )m0

0

0

= t¯m . [h] implies (8k 1)(9m0 k) 1 ([m 1t¯m )m0 = t m 2 T̄ . This, [g],
Claim 23, and Lemma A.2 imply [i] [m 1t¯m 2 N̄. Therefore, n equals [T ⇤ by the
definition of T ⇤ ; which equals [m 1t m by [b]; which equals [m 1 R(t¯m ) by [c]; which
equals R([m 1t¯m ) by rearrangement; which belongs to {R(n̄)|n̄2N̄} by [i].
Claim 27: {R(n̄)|n̄2N̄} = N. The ✓ direction holds by Claim 25. For the converse, take any n 2 N. If n 2 T , the result follows from Claim 11. If n 2
/ T , the result
follows from Claim 26.

Conclusion. (a) ([i2I Ci , N̄) is an OR tree by Claim 8. R|N̄ is injective by Claim 23
and Proposition 3.0. R|N̄ is onto N by Claim 27. (b) h([i2I Ci , N̄), (P̄, (H¯i )i2I )i is an
OR form with no shared alternatives and no absentmindedness by Claim 23.
Proof A.9 (for Theorem 5.1: KS simple) Part (a) follows from Claim 1(a), and
part (b) follows from Claims 10–12.
Claim 1: (a) (T, E, r) is a KS graph-tree, (b) (8t2T,t ] 2T ) t > t ] iff there is a walk
from t to t ] , and (c) the decision-node set derived from (T, ) equals the decision node
set derived from (T, E, r). ((c) will be used implicitly to ensure that the symbol X is
unambiguous). A simple tree is specified via order theory, while a KS graph-tree is
specified via graph theory. The conversion from the former to the latter is relatively
straightforward. Details are available on request.
Claim 2: (8t2T, ĉ2[i2I Ĉi ) t 2 p(ĉ) iff p 1 (t)\ĉ 6= ?. Take t and ĉ. By manipulation, t 2 p(ĉ) iff (9t ] 2ĉ) t = p(t ] ) iff (9t ] 2ĉ) t ] 2p 1 (t) iff p 1 (t)\ĉ 6= ?.

Claim 3: (8t2T rX) yt is well-defined and [KS3] holds at t. Suppose t 2 T rX.
Then [a] p 1 (t) = ? by the (simple) definition of X. Thus [b] {t ] 2T |(t,t ] )2E} = ?
by the theorem’s definition of E. Also, [a] implies [c] (8ĉ2[i2I Ĉi ) p 1 (t)\ĉ = ?.
Hence Claim 2 implies [d] (8ĉ2[i2I Ĉi ) t 2
/ p(ĉ). Hence [e] Ct = ? and [f] yt = ?
by the theorem’s definition of Ct and yt . [KS3] at t follows from [b], [e], and [f].
Claim 4: (8t2X) { {t ] } |t ] 2p 1 (t) } = { p 1 (t)\ĉ |t2p(ĉ), ĉ2[i2I Ĉi }. Take any
t 2 X. Because of no simultaneous decisions, there is an i⇤ 2 I such that J(t) = {i⇤ }.
I argue { {t ] } |t ] 2p 1 (t) } [a] equals { p 1 (t)\(\i2J(t) ĉi ) | (ĉi )i2J(t) 2Pi2J(t) Ai (t) } by
[s6]; which [b] equals { p 1 (t)\(\i2{i⇤ } ĉi ) | (ĉi )i2{i⇤ } 2Pi2{i⇤ } {ĉ2Ĉi |t2p(ĉ)} } by the
definitions of i⇤ and Ai⇤ ; which [c] equals { p 1 (t)\ĉ | ĉ2Ĉi⇤ , t2p(ĉ) } by rearrangement; which [d] equals { p 1 (t)\ĉ | ĉ2[i2I Ĉi , t2p(ĉ) } because the definitions of i⇤
and J imply that i⇤ is the only i 2 I for which Ai (t) = { ĉ2Ĉi |t2p(ĉ)} is nonempty.

Claim 5: (8t2X) yt is well-defined. Take t 2 X. Take ĉ 2 Ct . Then the definition
of Ct implies t 2 p(ĉ) and ĉ 2 [i2I Ĉi . Thus the ◆ direction of Claim 4 implies there
is t ]⇤ such that p 1 (t)\ĉ = {t ]⇤ }. It remains to show that t ]⇤ 2 {t ] 2T |(t,t ] )2E}. I
argue t ]⇤ [a] belongs to p 1 (t) by the second-previous sentence; which [b] equals
{t ] 2T |(t,t ] )2E} by the theorem’s definition of E.
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Claim 6: (8t2X) yt is surjective. Take t 2 X. Take t ]⇤ 2 {t ] 2T |(t,t ] )2E}. Then
by the definition of E, t ]⇤ 2 p 1 (t). Thus, by the ✓ direction of Claim 4, there exists
ĉ 2 [i2I Ĉi such that t 2 p(ĉ) and {t ]⇤ } = p 1 (t)\ĉ. The two set memberships imply
ĉ 2 Ct by the theorem’s definition of Ct , and the equality implies yt (ĉ) = t ]⇤ by the
theorem’s definition of yt .
Claim 7: (yt )t2T is well-defined, and [KS3] holds. Given Claims 3–6, it suffices
to show that (8t2X) yt is injective. Suppose not. Then there would be t 2 X, ĉ 2 Ct ,
and ĉ0 2 Ct such that ĉ 6= ĉ0 and yt (ĉ) = yt (ĉ0 ). Note that ĉ 2 Ct implies t 2 p(ĉ),
and similarly, that ĉ0 2 Ct implies t 2 p(ĉ0 ). The two together imply p(ĉ)\p(ĉ0 ) 6= ?.
This, ĉ 6= ĉ0 , and [s5] together imply that ĉ\ĉ0 = ?. Meanwhile, yt (ĉ) = yt (ĉ0 ) and
the definition of yt imply that p 1 (t)\ĉ and p 1 (t)\ĉ0 are identical singleton sets.
The last two sentences contradict one another.
Claim 8: P is well-defined, and [KS4] holds. Take any t 2 X. By the assumption
of no simultaneous decisions, J(t) is a singleton. Thus, by the definition of J, there is
a unique i for which (9ĉ2Ĉi ) t2p(ĉ).
Claim 9: [KS5] holds. Take any i. Note P 1 (i) equals {t2X | (9ĉ2Ĉi )t2p(ĉ) } by
the definition of P; which equals X \ [{p(ĉ)|ĉ2Ĉi } by rearrangement; which equals
[{p(ĉ)|ĉ2Ĉi } by the definitions of p and X. Also, Hi = {p(ĉ)|ĉ2Ĉi } by definition.
The last two sentences imply [Hi = P 1 (i). Hence it remains to show that the members of Hi = {p(ĉ)|ĉ2Ĉi } are nonempty and disjoint. Each p(ĉ) is nonempty because
[s4] requires that each ĉ is a nonempty subset of T r{r}. To show disjointness, suppose there were ĉ 2 Ĉi and ĉ0 2 Ĉi such that [1] p(ĉ) 6= p(ĉ0 ) and [2] p(ĉ)\p(ĉ0 ) 6= ?.
[1] implies ĉ 6= ĉ0 . This, [2], and [s5] imply p(ĉ) = p(ĉ0 ), which contradicts [1].

Claim 10: h(T, E, r), (Ct , yt )t2T , (P, (Hi )i2I )i is a well-defined KS form. Claims 5
and 8 show (yt )t2T and P are well-defined. Claim 1(a) and 7–9 show [KS1]–[KS5].
Thus it remains to show [KS6]. Toward that end, suppose [a] H 2 Hi , [b] t 1 2 H,
and [c] t 2 2 H. I will show Ct 1 6= Ct 2 leads to a contradiction. Toward that end, suppose Ct 1 6= Ct 2 . Then by the theorem’s definition of (Ct )t2T , {ĉ2[i2I Ĉi |t 1 2p(ĉ)} =
6
2
⇤
1
⇤
{ĉ2[i2I Ĉi |t 2p(ĉ)}. Thus, w.l.o.g., there is [d] ĉ 2 [i2I Ĉi such that [e] t 2 p(ĉ )
but [f] t 2 2
/ p(ĉ⇤ ). Note [g] p(ĉ⇤ ) belongs to {p(ĉ)|ĉ2[i2I Ĉi } by [d]; which equals
[i2I {p(ĉ)|ĉ2Ĉi } by rearrangement; which equals [i2I Hi by the theorem’s definition
of (Hi )i2I . Since [i] t 1 belongs to both H and p(ĉ⇤ ) by [b] and [e], and [ii] both H and
p(ĉ⇤ ) belong to [i2I Hi by [a] and [g], and [iii] the members of [i2I Hi are disjoint
by Claims 8 and 9, it must be that H = p(ĉ⇤ ). This contradicts [c] and [f].
Claim 11: The KS form has no trivial decisions. It suffices to show that (8t2T )
|Ct | 1 ) |Ct | 2. Toward that end, take t 2 T and suppose ĉ 2 Ct . By the definition
of Ct , t 2 p(ĉ) and ĉ 2 [i2I Ĉi . Thus, by the ◆ direction of Claim 4, there is t ] such
that [a] {t ] } = p 1 (t)\ĉ. Meanwhile, [s8] implies there is [b] t ]0 2 p 1 (t)rĉ. [a] and
[b] imply [c] t ]0 6= t ] . Further, [b] and the ✓ direction of Claim 4 imply there is [d]
ĉ0 2 [i2I Ĉi such that [e] t 2 p(ĉ0 ) and [f] {t ]0 } = p 1 (t)\ĉ0 . [f], [a], and [c] imply
ĉ0 6= ĉ. Finally, [d] and [e] imply ĉ0 2 Ct . So ĉ and ĉ0 are distinct members of Ct .
Claim 12: The KS form has no absentmindedness. Suppose there were a walk
from t 1 to t K and an H 2 [i2I Hi such that {t 1 ,t K } ✓ H. Since (t 1 ,t 2 ) 2 E,
Claim 6 implies there is ĉ 2 Ct 1 such that [a] yt 1 (ĉ) = t 2 . Further, since {t 1 ,t K } ✓ H,
(t k )Kk=1
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Claim 10 and [KS6] imply ĉ 2 Ct K . Thus we may define [b] t K+1 = yt K (ĉ). By the
definition of (yt )t2T , [a] and [b] imply [c] p 1 (t 1 )\ĉ = {t 2 } and [d] p 1 (t K )\ĉ =
{t K+1 }. [c] and [d] together imply [e] {t 2 ,t K+1 } ✓ ĉ. Further, [b] and Claim 11 imply
k k+1 ) 2 E;
(t K ,t K+1 ) 2 E; which implies (t k )K+1
k=2 is a walk; which implies (8kK) (t ,t
k
k+1
which by the definition of E implies (8kK) t = p(t ); which by the definition of
p and the transitivity of > implies t 2 > t K+1 . This and [e] contradict [s7].
Proof A.10 (for Theorem 5.2: KS ! simple) Part (a) follows from Claim 1(a), and
part (b) follows from Claim 16.
Claim 1: (a) The theorem’s part (a) holds, namely, (T, ) is a simple tree. (b) r
equals the root node derived from (T, ). (c) (8t2T,t ] 2T ) (t,t ] ) 2 E iff t = p(t ] ),
where p is derived from (T, ). (d) The decision-node set derived from (T, E, r)
equals the decision-node set derived from (T, ). ((b) and (d) will be used implicitly
to ensure that the symbols r and X are unambiguous.) A KS graph-tree is specified via
graph theory while a simple tree is specified via order theory. The conversion from
the former to the latter is relatively straightforward. Details are available on request.
Claim 2: (8t2T, c2Ct ) (a) yt (c) 2 T r{r} and (b) p(yt (c)) = t. Suppose c 2 Ct .
Then [KS3] implies yt (c) 2 {t 0 2T |(t,t 0 )2E}. Hence (t, yt (c)) 2 E. So t = p(yt (c))
by Claim 1(c). So yt (c) 2 T r{r} since the domain of p is T r{r}.

Claim 3: [s4] holds. Suppose ĉ 2 Ĉi . By the theorem’s definition of Ĉi , there are
[a] H 2 Hi and [b] c 2 CH such that [c] ĉ = {yt (c)|t2H}. It suffices to show [i]
ĉ 6= ? and [ii] ĉ ✓ T r{r}. [i] By [KS5] and [a], H is a member of a partition. So
H 6= ?. So there is t 2 H. So c 2 Ct by [b]. So yt (c) is well-defined by [KS3]. So
ĉ 6= ? by [c]. [ii] By [c], it suffices to show (8t2H) yt (c) 2 T r{r}. Toward that end,
take t 2 H. So c 2 Ct by [b]. So yt (c) 2 T r{r} by Claim 2(a).

Claim 4: (8i2I, ĉ2Ĉi , ĉ0 2Ĉi ) ĉ 6= ĉ0 ) ĉ\ĉ0 = ?. For the contrapositive, suppose
2 ĉ\ĉ0 . Then by the definition of Ĉi , there exist H 2 Hi , c 2 CH , and t 2 H such
that [a1] ĉ = {ys (c)|s2H} and [a2] yt (c) = t ] , and similarly, there exist H 0 2 Hi ,
c0 2 CH 0 , and t 0 2 H 0 such that [b1] ĉ0 = {ys (c0 )|s2H 0 } and [b2] yt 0 (c0 ) = t ] . [a2]
and [b2] imply [c] yt (c) = yt 0 (c0 ). Thus p(yt (c)) = p(yt 0 (c0 )). Thus by Claim 2(b),
[d] t = t 0 . Thus [e] H = H 0 by [KS5]. Further, since yt is injective by [KS3], [c] and
[d] imply [f] c = c0 . [a1], [b1], [e], and [f] imply ĉ = ĉ0 .

t]

Claim 5: (8i2I, ĉ2Ĉi ) p(ĉ) 2 Hi . Suppose ĉ 2 Ĉi . Then by the construction of
Ĉi , there are H 2 Hi and c 2 CH such that ĉ = {yt (c)|t2H}. I argue p(ĉ) [a] equals
{p(t ] )|t ] 2ĉ} be rearrangement; which [b] equals {p(t ] )|t ] 2{yt (c)|t2H}} by the previous sentence; which [c] equals {p(yt (c))|t2H} by rearrangement; which [d] equals
{t|t2H} by Claim 2(b); which equals H.
Claim 6: [s5] holds. Because of Claim 4, it suffices to show (8i2I, ĉ2Ĉi , ĉ0 2Ĉi )
p(ĉ)\p(ĉ) 6= ? ) p(ĉ) = p(ĉ0 ). Suppose ĉ 2 Ĉi , ĉ0 2 Ĉi , and p(ĉ)\p(ĉ0 ) 6= ?. By
two applications of Claim 5, p(ĉ) and p(ĉ0 ) belong to Hi . So p(ĉ) = p(ĉ0 ) by [KS5].
Claim 7: (8i2I, H2Hi ,t2H, c2CH ) p 1 (t)\{ys (c)|s2H} = {yt (c)}. Suppose
H 2 Hi , t 2 H, and c 2 CH . Take any t ] in the intersection. Then there is s 2 H such
that [a] ys (c) = t ] . Thus by Lemma 2(b), [b] p(t ] ) = s. But since t ] 2 p 1 (t) by
assumption, [c] p(t ] ) = t. [b] and [c] imply s = t and thus [a] implies t ] = yt (c).
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Conversely, yt (c) 2 p 1 (t) by [KS3] and Claim 1(c). Also, yt (c) 2 {ys (c)|s2H} by
t 2 H. Hence yt (c) is in the intersection.

Claim 8: (8t2X,t ] 2p 1 (t))(9i2I, ĉ2Ĉi ) (a) t 2 p(ĉ) and (b) p 1 \ĉ = {t ] }. Suppose [1] t 2 X and [2] t ] 2 p 1 (t). By [1], [KS4], and [KS5], there are i 2 I and
[3] H 2 Hi such that [4] t 2 H. By [2], [KS3], and Claim 1(c), there is [5] c 2 Ct
such that [6] yt (c) = t ] . Further, by [4], [5], [KS6], and the definition of CH , [7]
c 2 CH . Let ĉ = {ys (c)|s2H}. Note ĉ 2 Ĉi by [3] and [7]. For (a), note that p(ĉ)
equals {p ys (c)|s2H} by the definition of ĉ; which equals {s|s2H} by Claim 2(b);
which equals H. This equality and [4] imply t 2 p(ĉ). For (b), note that p 1 (t)\ĉ
equals p 1 (t)\{ys (c)|s2H} by the definition of ĉ; which equals {yt (c)} by Claim 7,
[3], [4] and [7]; which equals {t ] } by [6].
Claim 9: (8t2X) { {t ] } |t ] 2p 1 (t) } = { p 1 (t)\ĉ |t2p(ĉ), ĉ2[i2I Ĉi }. The ✓ direction follows from Claim 8. For the ◆ direction, suppose [a] t 2 p(ĉ) and [b] ĉ 2 Ĉi .
By [b] and the construction of Ĉi , there exist [c] H 2 Hi and [d] c 2 CH such that [e]
ĉ = {ys (c)|s2H}. Note p(ĉ) equals {p ys (c)|s2H} by [e]; which equals {s|s2H} by
Claim 2(b); which equals H. This equality and [a] imply [f] t 2 H. Further, p 1 (t)\ĉ
equals p 1 (t)\{ys (c)|s2H} by [e], which equals {yt (c)} by Claim 7, [c], [d], and
[f]. Thus it suffices to show that yt (c) 2 p 1 (t). This holds by [KS3] and Claim 1(c).
Claim 10: (8t2X, i2I, ĉ2Ĉi ) t 2 p(ĉ) ) P(t) = i. Suppose t 2 X, [a] ĉ 2 Ĉi , and
[b] t 2 p(ĉ). Claim 5 and [a] imply p(ĉ) 2 Hi . This and [b] imply t 2 [Hi . This and
[KS5] imply t 2 P 1 (i). This and [KS4] imply P(t) = i.
Claim 11: (8t2X, i2I r{P(t)}) Ai (t) = ?. Suppose Ai (t) 6= ?. Then there exists
ĉ 2 Ai (t). By the definition of Ai (t), ĉ 2 Ĉi and t 2 p(ĉ). Thus by Claim 10, P(t) = i.
Claim 12: (8t2X) J(t) = {P(t)}. Take t 2 X. Then P(t) is well-defined by [KS4].
Further, by the definition of X, p 1 (t) 6= ?. Thus by Claim 9, there is [1] ĉ 2 [i2I Ĉi
such that [2] t 2 p(ĉ). [1] implies there is i⇤ 2 I such that [3] ĉ 2 Ĉi⇤ . [2] and [3]
imply ĉ 2 Ai⇤ (t). So Claim 11 implies both i⇤ = P(t) and J(t) = {P(t)}.

Claim 13: [s6] holds. Take t 2 X. J(t) 6= ? by Claim 12. Also, { {t ] } |t ] 2p 1 (t) }
[1] equals { p 1 (t)\ĉ | t2p(ĉ), ĉ2[i2I Ĉi } by Claim 9; which [2] equals { p 1 (t)\ĉ |
t2p(ĉ), ĉ2ĈP(t) } by Claim 10; which [3] equals { p 1 (t)\ĉ | ĉ2AP(t) } by the definition of (Ai )i2I ; which [4] equals { p 1 (t)\(\i2J(t) ĉi ) | (ĉi )i2J(t) 2Pi2J(t) Ai (t) } by
Claim 12.
Claim 14: [s7] holds. Suppose there were [1] ĉ 2 Ĉi and [2] {t ]A ,t ]B } ✓ ĉ such
that [3] t ]A > t ]B . [3] and the construction of > imply there is a walk (t k )Kk=1 from
t 1 = t ]A to t K = t ]B . [1] and the construction of ĉ imply there are H 2 Hi and c 2 CH
such that ĉ = {ys (c)|s2H}. This and [2] imply there is [4] {t A ,t B } ✓ H such that
yt A (c) = t ]A and yt B (c) = t ]B . Thus by Claim 2(b), [5] t A = p(t ]A ) and [6] t B = p(t ]B ).
K is a walk from t 0 = t A over
By Claim 1(c), [5] implies (t A ,t ]A ) 2 E and thus (t k )t=0
1
]A
K
]B
K
1
]B
t = t to t = t . Note (t
,t ) 2 E. Thus by Claim 1(c), t K 1 = p(t ]B ). This
and [6] imply t K 1 = t B . Thus (t k )Kk=01 is a walk from t 0 = t A to t K 1 = t B . This and
[4] contradict the assumption that the KS form has no absentmindedness.
Claim 15: [s8] holds. Suppose there were t 2 X and ĉ 2 Ĉi such that p 1 (t) ✓ ĉ.
By construction, there exists [1] H 2 Hi and [2] c 2 CH such that ĉ = {ys (c)|s2H}.
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By the previous two sentences, [3] p 1 (t) ✓ {ys (c)|s2H}. Note that {t} equals
p p 1 (t) because p 1 (t) 6= ? by t 2 X; which is a subset of {p ys (c)|s2H} by
[3]; which equals {s|s2H} by Claim 2(b); which equals H. In other words, [4] t 2 H.
Further, {yt (c0 )|c0 2Ct } equals {t ] 2T |(t,t ] )2E} by [KS3]; which equals p 1 (t) by
Claim 1(c); which equals p 1 (t)\{ys (c)|s2H} by [3]; which equals {yt (c)} by
Claim 7, [1], [2], and [4]. In brief, [5] {yt (c0 )|c0 2Ct } = {yt (c)}. Since yt is injective by [KS3], [5] implies |Ct | = 1. This contradicts the assumption that the KS
form has no trivial decisions.
Claim 16: The theorem’s part (b) holds. (T, , (Ĉi )i2I ) is a simple form by Claims
1(a), 3, 6, 13, 14, and 15. It has no simultaneous decisions by Claim 12.
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